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Abstract:   
This essay synthesizes recent writing on the constitutional history of slavery, featuring Mark 
Graber’s Dred Scott and the Problem of Constitutional Evil (2006). It offers a historical and 
legal analysis of Dred Scott that attempts to clarify the roles of both law and politics in 
controversial judicial decisions. It joins Graber in rehabilitating Chief Justice Taney’s Dred 
Scott opinion as a plausible implementation of a Constitution that was born in slavery and grew 
only more suffused with slavery over time. It integrates much recent writing on the social, 
political, and constitutional history of slavery to develop the context in which the Dred Scott 
opinions must be read. And it finds that Justice Curtis’s celebrated dissent amounted to an 
unjudicial manipulation of the law, not the judicial masterpiece of historiographical lore, 
although driven by the higher purpose of striking at the political hegemony of the slaveholding 
class. 
 This essay is an unabridged version of a shorter work that is forthcoming in Law and 
Social Inquiry (Summer 2009).   
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1413886
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INTRODUCTION 
What makes a judicial opinion specially political? Do we just know it when we see it?  In 
a time when no legal scholar believes that adjudication, especially at the Supreme Court, can be 
apolitical, is it worthwhile or even possible to identify those opinions that are specially 
“political”? These questions are raised for me by recent scholarship that attempts to rehabilitate 
the Court’s judgment and reasoning in the famously political Dred Scott decision, the 1857 case 
that denied Congress authority to prevent the expansion of slavery, denied black Americans 
citizenship simply by virtue of their descent from slaves, and perhaps helped to bring on the 
Civil War. Although the decision is deeply offensive now, and was so even in 1857 to many 
Americans, I agree with the general thrust of the revisionist work on this case and, in this essay, 
mean to go a step further. I will argue that, in fact, Chief Justice Taney’s opinion represented an 
effort to vindicate law as an alternative to violence, whereas Justice Curtis’s celebrated dissent 
evinced a lawless--though perhaps admirable--determination to put the South in its place. 
 For a good while now, judges and scholars have unanimously condemned Chief Justice 
Taney’s opinion as inexcusably partisan. In doing so, and in criticizing other opinions as 
excessively political, scholars of the judicial process have evinced a need to understand how the 
judicial mode of governance relates to the legislative, executive, and administrative modes and to 
principles of popular governance more generally. Especially in the politically charged arena of 
constitutional review, scholars have sought to understand how different public actors interact to 
establish the meaning of the Constitution (Keck 2007; Whittington 2007; Whittington 1999; 
Leonard 2002; Leonard 2001; Ackerman 1991; Kramer 2004; Graber forthcoming). And in some 
cases that means that we want to know when the judiciary has exercised (or usurped) authority 
plausibly claimed by some other institution or process. 
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 Treatments of this question, though, often end up condemning the Supreme Court for 
rendering this or that “political” decision, without adequately explaining what makes the 
decision more political than so many others.1  Historians often ask whether a particular judicial 
decision was genuinely driven by law or by politics. But the literature offers no standard for 
judging a judicial opinion excessively political unless we just measure the degree of offense the 
opinion gives to our own political beliefs. 
 By this measure, the 1857 case of Dred Scott was about as political a case as one could 
imagine, and it has only gotten more political over time as the nation has become more widely 
averse not only to slavery but to the unabashed racism of the opinion. In that case, a mostly 
Southern majority of the Court entered the sectional controversy that had been threatening the 
existence of the Union with increasing intensity for several decades. As the nation’s politics 
boiled with conflicts over the right (or not) of slaveholders to carry slaves into the nation’s 
western territories, the Court confronted Harriet and Dred Scott’s legal claim that they had each 
gained their freedom by their extended residence in free territory. Dred Scott had accompanied 
his master to his military postings in Illinois and then in the Wisconsin Territory. In Wisconsin, 
he met Harriet, also a slave who had accompanied her master to his military posting. With their 
                                                 
1  Thus, behaviorist political scientists, who have shown statistically that the Supreme Court makes 
its decisions “politically,” have advanced understanding in only limited ways. The behaviorists have done 
valuable work in lending a degree of rigor to any number of interesting questions about the Court. But on 
the questions about whether Supreme Court decisions are governed by law or by the judges’ personal and 
political “attitudes,” it seems to me that the behaviorists and their opponents do not actually disagree in 
very important ways. It is a truism at this point that decisions of the Supreme Court, which exists largely 
to take on the most controversial and legally indeterminate cases, are determined in many cases and in 
significant part by some underlying values of the justices, though the behaviorists have valuably 
quantified this point. But legal scholars insist that it is also true that the justices consult much more than 
their own values; that the precise shape and outcome of judicial decisions also depends in significant 
degree on the legal materials available and the imperatives of judicial method and legal argument. What 
neither side has done particularly well is to attempt a sophisticated statement of how much politics there is 
in this or that opinion and how much law. A new essay by Brian Tamanaha (forthcoming) reviews the 
literature, raises this “how much” question, and debunks the myth that judges have widely bought into the 
mechanical, formalistic models of their work. For prominent exponents of behaviorism, see Segal and 
Spaeth (2002). Their critics include Michael Gerhardt (2003) and Mark Graber (forthcoming). 
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masters’ permission, the two married before eventually returning to Missouri. Later suing for 
their freedom in Missouri state court, the Scotts appeared to have an excellent chance of winning 
under Missouri state law, since courts there had commonly accepted that a slaveholder’s 
extended removal of a slave to a free state resulted in permanent emancipation, effective even in 
Missouri by virtue of comity. But in the Scotts’ case, the state’s supreme court declined to 
continue such extensions of comity amid Northern attacks on slavery. It held instead that the 
Scotts remained in bondage. Rather than appeal the state court’s judgment to the federal 
Supreme Court (since clear precedent effectively blocked that route), the Scotts tried launching a 
new suit in federal court. The federal judge determined that the Scotts were eligible to sue in 
federal court, because if free they would count as citizens of Missouri for purposes of Article III 
of the Constitution; as citizens, they might use the federal forum to sue their owner, who was at 
that time a citizen of a different state. Ultimately, though, the Scotts lost the federal action on the 
merits in the trial court. 
 Appealing that loss to the Supreme Court, the Scotts presented, or at least opened the 
door to, two issues: whether native-born Americans descended from African American slaves 
could count as citizens under the Constitution; and whether the Missouri Compromise, which 
had long formally barred slavery from a huge swath of territory, exceeded Congress’s authority. 
It is worth remembering that this expansive territory from which slavery had ostensibly been 
excluded, north and west of Missouri, had gotten little attention from American settlers before 
the 1850s and had in fact harbored de facto slavery openly--witness the Scotts’ own experience 
in Wisconsin (VanderVelde and Subramanian 1997, 1048-50). Thus, for all its alleged 
sacredness as a Union-saving compromise, the Missouri Compromise had had little operative 
consequence in the actual territory it purportedly governed. Moreover, once meaningful 
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settlement was in the offing, the Missouri Compromise was repealed (in the Kansas-Nebraska 
Act of 1854), and the formal right to carry slaves into this huge territory was restored over the 
fervent opposition of much (but not nearly all) of the North. Shortly after this restoration, Chief 
Justice Taney held in Scott2 both that native-born African Americans occupied so pervasively 
subordinate a position in American society that practically none of them could ever 
constitutionally count as citizens and that Congress had never had the power to exclude slavery 
from the territory at issue. The territorial ruling, especially, appeared to large parts of the North 
as an outrageous judicial manipulation of the Constitution. 
 The Court’s holdings were highly political both in the sense that they took sides on some 
issues that were actively under debate in the political world and in the court-specific sense that 
they rested on premises that no mechanical reasoning or neutral principles could simply confirm 
or refute. Like every judicial opinion, Taney’s was constructed from a combination of closely 
disciplined elements of legal reasoning and relatively undisciplined judgments about both factual 
and legal questions for which the available materials offered no clear answers. When Taney 
chose to defend and write into law some of the slaveholding states’ most controversial claims, he 
earned himself the charge that he had dragged the Court down from its elevated station and 
converted it into the merely political agent of the proslavery South. This charge was trumpeted 
across the North by the Republicans of 1857 and again by a virtually complete scholarly 
consensus at least since Don Fehrenbacher’s monumental 1978 monograph, The Dred Scott 
                                                 
2  From here on, I’ll refer to the case as Scott, rather than Dred Scott, both because the fate of the 
entire Scott family--Harriet, Dred, and their daughters--was at issue and because Dred’s own facts were 
probably not adequate to raise all the legal issues in the case; facts peculiar to members of his family were 
necessary for that. In particular, Dred resided for a time in Illinois before going to the Wisconsin 
Territory, thus arguably rendering his time in the area governed by the Missouri Compromise 
superfluous: either he had already gained his freedom in Illinois or he was not going to gain it at all. 
Harriet Scott, on the other hand, arguably could rely only on her residence in the Wisconsin Territory as 
the basis for her claim to freedom, thus potentially raising the question of the constitutionality of the 
Missouri Compromise. For other variations on this theme, see VanderVelde and Subramanian (1997).  
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Case.   
 The modern condemnations rest on some premises that I share: that, political as judging 
must often or always be, there is something distinctive and meaningful about the activities of 
judges relative to those of legislators and executive officers3; and that a narrative of any 
important episode in judicial history rightly embraces the question whether the judges’ actions 
represented recognizably judicial action or, alternatively, encroachment on the authority of other 
actors and institutions.   
 I propose that there is a workable standard, consistent with these premises, for 
determining when judges have stepped outside the bounds of judicial action.  This standard 
probably renders Bush v. Gore (2000) and Marbury v. Madison (1803) largely outside those 
bounds and, for example, Lochner v. New York (1905) and Scott (mostly) well within. I do not 
think the standard I suggest will surprise anybody, but I do hope that the application of it in this 
essay will contribute to a less political history of judicial politics. I suggest that it makes little 
sense to deem judges excessively political when they resolve controversial cases by relying on 
their personal judgments as to the meaning of indeterminate legal materials, however much one 
may disagree with those judgments. It is fair enough to call that a political activity, but that is 
what judges are generally required to do, so it can hardly be thought unjudicial. It does, however, 
make sense to deem unjudicial--not just political but unjudicial--those judges who demonstrably 
seize on a case for purposes other than the need to decide the case at hand or the need to provide 
guidance for lower courts going forward. I think this standard does and should accommodate a 
judge’s discretionary choice among available paths to get to a final judgment, even when that 
choice seems driven by a silent ambition to influence policy beyond the case itself; the standard 
                                                 
3  I find the recent essay by Thomas Keck (2007) especially clear and useful. Also see Graber 
(forthcoming). 
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does not mandate minimalist judging. I also think the standard does and should accommodate 
some measure of dictum, reasonably related to the well-considered issues in the case and meant 
to guide lower courts in cases likely to emerge.4  But the standard would render unjudicial any 
indulgence in dictum that is rendered with the evident ambition to influence or control public 
deliberations rather than provide effective guidance for lower courts. The spirit of the judicial 
role is that, whatever the particulars of the instant case, the greater goal is not the making of 
policy but the perpetuation of the authority of law. 
 Finally, as a corollary to the above principles, it seems clear that the most unjudicial 
conduct of a court lies in the deployment of a “legal” principle or argument for one case only, 
with none of the discipline that comes from the knowledge that the reasoning must be adhered to 
in other similar cases. Such judicial behavior is the ne plus ultra of the more common (but harder 
to demonstrate) judicial practice of applying legal principles inconsistently from case to case. 
Such behavior demonstrates the court’s determination simply to conclude a public question 
rather than to implement and perpetuate the authority of law. To justify a final judgment by 
reference to a “law” that the judge is not willing to treat as a law, applicable to more than one 
specially selected case, has to be understood as the very worst kind of dictum; the judgment is an 
ipse dixit and the opinion a mere polemic. 
 By my standards, then, it is usually futile to label an opinion political in the sense of 
being illegitimate or unjudicial. Nonetheless, there are some clear examples in American judicial 
history. For a simple but egregious example of dictum, consider Chief Justice John Marshall’s 
use of the Marbury case in 1803 to lecture Madison and Jefferson on their executive obligations. 
                                                 
4  Some might insist that judges act illegitimately any time they say more than is necessary to 
decide the case, but it seems obvious to me that courts often extend their opinions to guide lower courts 
on questions clearly related to the one at hand and likely to arise in short order. That may seem a violation 
of the judge’s formal role, but such pragmatic guidance hardly seems a usurpation in any meaningful 
sense. 
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The case famously raised the question whether the Supreme Court had the authority to order 
President Jefferson or Secretary of State Madison to deliver some judicial commissions. The 
commissions had been signed by the previous president but never delivered by the then-secretary 
of state (who had been, of course, John Marshall himself). Since Marshall concluded that the 
Court lacked that authority, it is very hard to see anything judicial in his extending the opinion to 
argue that Jefferson and Madison nevertheless had an obligation to deliver the commissions. 
Coming at a moment of extraordinary constitutional and political tension between Marshall’s 
Federalist Party and Jefferson’s newly ascendant Republican Party, it constituted a bold 
intervention in a public controversy without any accompanying prospect of guiding lower 
courts,5 let alone explaining the judgment in the case (Ackerman 2005). In contrast, the opinion’s 
controversial invalidation of a section of the Judiciary Act may have been political in the usual 
sense and possibly even motivated by unjudicial purposes, but that holding and argument were 
hardly unjudicial.6   
 Even worse, the per curiam opinion in Bush v. Gore (2000), which I think is understood 
to have been the work of Justice Kennedy, seems to me as unjudicial a Supreme Court opinion as 
any I have encountered. That view rests not so much on the unlikelihood that Justice Kennedy 
honestly favored some of the constitutional doctrines by which he justified his choosing of a 
president, nor on the weakness of those arguments or on the necessarily political character of the 
Court’s choice in taking a case that it had every right (but no obligation) to take. It rests instead 
on Kennedy’s attempt to strip the opinion of all judicial character by prospectively confining it to 
                                                 
5  In theory, Marbury might have been able to go to a lower federal court to seek mandamus, but I 
have never seen anyone suggest that Marshall’s dictum was actually offered as guidance to lower courts 
likely to encounter petitions for mandamus against the president and/or secretary of state. 
6  See Bruce Ackerman (2005) for the latest scholarly word on Marshall and Marbury. Ackerman 
paints Marshall--rightly, I think--as a profoundly political animal with few scruples about using his office 
in unjudicial ways. 
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its facts: “Our consideration is limited to the present circumstances, for the problem of equal 
protection in election processes generally presents many complexities” (109).7  Of course, most 
problems before the Supreme Court present many complexities, but that never leads the Court to 
declare its reasoning unavailable as law for the future. In attempting to strip his own opinion of 
all precedential value from the moment of its publication, he deprived it of the very thing that 
might have made it judicial, even as every opinion in that case had some unavoidably political 
character.8  In doing so, he was no longer deciding a judicial case, no longer seeking to vindicate 
law so much as arrogating to the Court the authority to settle a public controversy. 
 The standard I am proposing accommodates the truth that all judging has some 
unavoidably political components. It embraces as “judicial” the great majority of Supreme Court 
opinions, from those that are driven almost mechanically by reference to precedent and/or 
statutory language to those that rest on highly indeterminate legal sources, and so take on a more 
overtly political character. At the same time, the standard reflects the American conviction that, 
even in comparatively political cases, it is imperative that judicial politics remain judicial and 
that judges limit themselves to deciding the cases in front of them and guiding lower courts. 
Even though those functions must be understood realistically to leave the judges substantial 
discretion to affect broader political debates, a careful adherence to the professional norms of 
                                                 
7  Whether this language actually is meant to eliminate the opinion’s precedential value has been a 
matter of some debate not only among scholars but in a continuing way in the lower courts, all of which is 
concisely summed up and the merits of the question evaluated by Chad Flanders (2007). The reasons why 
Justice Kennedy would have so undermined his own opinion probably rest in the unlikelihood that he 
would apply the Bush principles more broadly in election cases--perhaps also in the unlikelihood, as 
Richard Pildes (2004, 48-49) points out, that they even could be applied without unmanageable 
administrative expense.  
8  It is true that other courts do related sorts of ad hoc justice all the time. See, for example, the 
relatively informal justice that often gets dispensed by trial courts and by appeals courts that choose not to 
publish many of their opinions. Perhaps that behavior is unjudicial, too, or perhaps not. But I think the 
precise questions raised by those practices are meaningfully different from those raised by controversial 
Supreme Court opinions. 
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judging is assumed to be central to the preservation of law. 
 What of Scott, then, so often condemned as the ultimate in unjudicial judging? Can we 
fairly say that the justices in the majority behaved as judges? Or, to the contrary, must we 
conclude that they somehow sullied their offices more than all those other courts that joined in 
the continuance of slavery before the Civil War? The judgment of recent decades has been 
virtually unanimous that the Scott majority did obviously, flagrantly, and unforgivably depart 
from its authorized role to pursue a proslavery agenda by whatever unscrupulous means it 
thought might work. In particular, Don Fehrenbacher (1978) thought it important to devote 
dozens of pages to establishing the claim that Taney’s opinion was a document of “unmitigated 
partisanship” rather than a legitimately judicial opinion (3). And it is not hard to find scholars 
who refer to the case almost reflexively as “transparently partisan” (Simon 2006, 125) or as the 
“worst atrocity” in the history of the Court (Eisgruber 1993, 41).9 
                                                 
9  Here is some historiography of the Scott case:  Since Fehrenbacher’s declaration that Taney’s 
opinion amounted to pure partisanship, few have disagreed.  I don’t mean here to discuss what I’ll call the 
political historiography of the case, the writing that assesses the case’s impact on the popular politics of 
the sectional crisis as of March, 1857.  As far as possible, I mean to discuss only scholars’ conclusions as 
to the causes of the Scott opinions and thus the case’s place (or not) in legal history; that is, whether Scott 
is best understood, in its time, as a product of political undermining of the judicial process or, on the other 
hand, a product of the judicial process itself, a reflection of the law’s preexisting principles and tendencies 
as of 1857, given the preceding decades of judicial support for slaveholding rights under the Constitution. 
 Unfortunately, the years since Fehrenbacher’s 1978 opus saw little sustained historical writing on 
this question until very recently.  Scholarly reviews of Fehrenbacher at the time tended to be highly 
supportive of his claims.  Although Paul Finkelman offered some corrections on a few matters, he found 
Fehrenbacher’s arguments, including his thrashing of Taney, almost “invariably sound” (Finkelman 1979, 
374).  Harold Hyman’s review devoted most of his energy to a celebration of Fehrenbacher’s 
condemnation of Taney’s opinion, praising Fehrenbacher for shouldering the historian’s alleged 
“responsibility to serve as a moral critic” (Hyman 1979, 439-441).  And, in the Stanford Law Review, 
Gary Simson offered some defenses of some of Taney’s reasoning but, at bottom, embraced 
Fehrenbacher’s claim that Taney’s opinion was marked by “innumerable misrepresentations of law and 
fact” (Simson 1980, 884). 
 More recent writing (Austin and Graber aside, of course) has tended in the same direction.  
Christopher Eisgruber called the case the Court’s “worst atrocity” (Eisgruber 1993, 41).  And Louise 
Weinberg finished her argument for the historical importance of the case by declaring that “History has 
not forgiven the Taney Court for Dred Scott, and it never should.” (Weinberg 2007, 139)  Keith 
Whittington has taken a more measured tone and criticized Taney less for any legal distortions than for 
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 Quite a surprise, therefore, awaits when one goes back to the Taney and Curtis opinions 
                                                 
his ambition to settle a question better left to the politicians, but he also implicitly embraced the general 
consensus about the opinion: “Dred Scott has been universally denounced as a terrible mistake by the 
Court. Chief Justice Hughes [in 1928] labeled it a ‘self-inflicted wound’ and a ‘public calamity.’ Robert 
McCloskey [in 1962] regarded it as ‘the most disastrous opinion the Supreme Court has ever issued.’ 
Alexander Bickel [in 1970] called it ‘a ghastly error,’ and his protege Robert Bork [in 1990] consider[ed] 
it ‘the worst constitutional decision of the nineteenth century’” (Whittington 2001, 366).  All of this 
despite the fact that the weight of professional historical opinion discounts the impact of the case on the 
coming of the war or even the election of Lincoln (Whittington 2001, 380, citing Fehrenbacher, Graber, 
and Stampp).   
 Even historians who demonstrate a full understanding of the pervasive effects of slavery on 
antebellum institutions find themselves suddenly jumping on the bandwagon when reading Taney’s 
opinion.  Thus Hyman and Wiecek produced an accomplished constitutional history of Jacksonian 
America, often revealing the profound influence of slavery on the Constitution and its history, only to 
deem Taney’s opinion specially indefensible (Hyman and Wiecek 1982, 180-89).  To me, these authors 
could more naturally have read Taney’s opinion as the climax of long-standing legal and constitutional 
tendencies in the Jacksonian and antebellum years, not as a special corruption of the law. Like Hyman 
and Wiecek, Michael Zuckert explains how deeply slavery infected the Constitution and its history and 
constrained what judges could do, but he too concludes that “we must judge” the majority justices for 
taking “the least defensible” course (Zuckert 2007, 328). Similarly, James Simon’s recent treatment of 
Taney and Lincoln offers a remarkably fair portrait of Taney as a powerful legal mind and a consistent 
thinker, trapped in the dilemmas of slave society, only to suddenly condemn his Scott opinion as 
“transparently partisan” (Simon 2006, 125).  Earl Maltz’s recent book on Scott similarly manages to 
deliver very fair mini-biographies of the Justices that ventilate the Southern constitutional perspective 
only to conclude with a condemnation of Taney for his “judicial hubris” and his “fundamental 
misunderstanding of the appropriate role of the Supreme Court in the American political system” (Maltz, 
2007a, 156).  As the main text will show, it’s not that I disagree that there was an element of judicial 
hubris in Taney’s opinion, but I think these accusations ignore the much greater defects in Curtis’s 
opinion.   
 Until recently, I had classed Paul Finkelman with this last group, because his teaching book on 
Scott leaves the usual impression that there is nothing good to be said about Taney’s performance as a 
judge in that case (Finkelman 1997).  But he has recently been dropping hints that Taney may have 
decided the case in a legally correct—or at least defensible—manner, given the nature of the original 
Constitution and the slaveholding society it served (Finkelman 2007, 4-5).  Sanford Levinson evinced a 
similar ambivalence, perhaps, when in a single article he referred to Taney’s “egregious opinion” in Scott 
but then raised the question—without answering it--whether Taney might actually have been “right.” 
Given “the basic decision in 1787 to enter a union with slaveholders” and to bear the “consequences for 
every aspect of American constitutional doctrine,” he suggests the plausibility of the claim that racism 
was then “a fundamental value” (Levinson 1993, 1089, 1092, 1104-1108).  Another example of openness 
to the possible rightness of Taney’s opinion, though a somewhat odd one, appears in Bruce Ackerman’s 
We the People (1991).  Ackerman did not develop this point about Scott, only tossing out the suggestion 
that Scott might have been rightly decided in its time, because he wanted to make a larger point about the 
need to revisit the Lochner case and an even larger point about long term constitutional transformations.  
In any case, I think scholars of Scott should take to heart what Ackerman said about Lochner, which I 
adapt here for Scott:  “We can begin to look upon the [southern-leaning] judges as judges, not pariahs, 
whose decisions differ from modern case law largely because the Constitution they were interpreting was 
importantly different from the transformed Constitution left to us by the [Reconstruction Amendments]” 
(Ackerman 1991, 66). 
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to evaluate them carefully, especially in light of recent scholarship by historians, political 
scientists, and legal scholars. Resting on a general recognition that racism and slavery were the 
order of that historical day (Levinson 1993), these recent works range from aggressively 
revisionist accounts of Scott by Mark Graber and Austin Allen to much broader-gauged forays 
into the socioconstitutional history of slavery like those of William Freehling (2007; 1990), Lacy 
Ford (2008), John Craig Hammond (2007), David Lightner (2006), Earl Maltz (2007a), Matthew 
Mason (2006), James Simon (2006), Eva Wolf (2006), Michael Zuckert (2007), and others. Part 
I of this essay, then, will synthesize this body of recent writing to redraw the big picture of 
Scott’s place in legal-historical scholarship--to reconstitute the constitutional history of Scott. All 
the works I draw on help to reopen a window on Scott as something other than a usurpation by 
partisan judges.   
 Graber’s Dred Scott and the Problem of Constitutional Evil (2006), in particular, is a tour 
de force in its vindication of the insights of the constitutional politics school of political science. 
His book does miss the mark with respect to its grander claims about “constitutional evil,” and, 
for my purposes, it pays too little attention to the principal opinions themselves. Graber 
decisively debunks many of the careless condemnations of Taney and the reflexive praise for 
Curtis that predominates in the literature. But he does not go far enough for a legal scholar or a 
legal historian in explicating why Taney and Curtis wrote as they did and whether either or both 
of them truly abandoned the judicial role to exploit their positions for unjudicial purposes. Still, 
Graber’s work and a wave of recent historical literature give us the necessary preconditions for 
rereading the Scott opinions. This larger body of scholarship can be read to deepen the targeted 
revisionism of Graber and of the somewhat less successful, though still valuable, Allen book 
(2006). This broader literature elucidates the degree to which racism and slavery clung not just to 
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specific clauses of the Constitution but to the Constitution’s divergent social and political 
histories in the North and South. These works broaden and clarify the context within which Scott 
must be understood, restore real interest in the case as an important artifact of legal as well as 
political history, and fruitfully reopen the perennial puzzle of the law-politics relationship. 
 Part II of this essay builds on this historiographical foundation to do a detailed 
reexamination of both Taney’s majority opinion in Scott and Curtis’s dissent. Taney’s opinion 
has been so thoroughly reviled and Curtis’s dissent so honored, almost hallowed,10 that they have 
become shorthand for judicial decadence, on the one hand, and judicial probity, on the other. It 
may come as a great shock, then, to discover that Curtis’s opinion turns out not just to be 
political--as the constitutional politics school reminds us every opinion is--but to verge on the 
unjudicial. Close attention to the precise arguments made by Curtis--especially his attempt to 
undermine the authority of the Missouri Supreme Court--reveals a judge who perhaps no longer 
cared to be bound by the rules of judicial argument. As for Taney, his opinion, too, was 
unavoidably political, but in only one brief instance can I see that he crossed the line to 
unjudicial behavior, whereas some of his most widely condemned claims--especially his 
argument for a due process right to bring slaves to the territories--turn out to be far more 
sophisticated and far more judicial than his critics have recognized. A close examination of the 
opinions11 in this famously political case will help us see why they were written as they were and 
where legitimately judicial politics ends and unjudicial usurpation begins. 
 
                                                 
10  Most recently, see Maltz (2007b, 265, note 1). 
11  Space precludes analyzing all of the Scott opinions, so I have chosen only Taney’s and Curtis’s, 
the ones I take to be the most important. Justice McLean’s anti-Southern opinion has perhaps been even 
more celebrated than Curtis’s for its firmer antislavery tone, but it has also been widely thought much 
more political and much less accomplished as a legal rejoinder to Taney and the others in the majority 
(Maltz 2007a, 129-39).  
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I.  THE EMERGING HISTORIOGRAPHY OF SLAVERY AND THE CONSTITUTION: 
FROM THE PHILADELPHIA CONVENTION TO SCOTT 
Graber and Scott Revisionism 
 Over the last few years, a fresh body of historical writing has addressed the development 
of the Constitution and slavery between 1787 and the Civil War.  The most starkly revisionist of 
these writings are Mark Graber’s Dred Scott and the Problem of Constitutional Evil and Austin 
Allen’s Origins of the Dred Scott Case, both published in 2006. Each of these reframes familiar 
events in stimulating ways, but Graber’s is the more successful historical work and should be the 
foundation of Scott studies for the foreseeable future. 
 To understand Graber’s contribution, it is valuable to start with a brief appreciation and 
critique of the doctrine-centered account of his co-revisionist, Allen. Allen argues that the 
sectional crisis that supposedly preoccupied the nation in the 1850s was actually just one of two 
main sources of the Court’s decision. The origins of the Dred Scott case, for Allen, lay just as 
much in Jacksonian jurisprudence, a collection of doctrinal tensions that had developed through 
two decades of Taney Court decisions. The relevant Jacksonian jurisprudence comprised not just 
the Court’s slave cases but equally its sometimes chaotic cases on diversity jurisdiction, the 
commerce clause, the contracts clause, state police powers, and other cases touching the 
relationship between the national and state governments. 
 The problem is that, although Allen’s book offers a number of important insights, it does 
not, in the end, adequately connect its problematic version of Jacksonian jurisprudence to the 
Scott opinions as written. Allen offers little evidence that the justices actually saw the 
connections among the several categories of cases that he discusses. One just cannot tell from the 
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evidence presented whether the justices were thinking about slavery when discussing, for 
example, the constitutionality of state liquor regulation, or corporate citizenship in diversity 
cases, or federal exclusivity under the commerce clause.   
 Moreover, when coming to Scott, Allen slips into some excessive claims. It is hard to 
credit his suggestion that Scott can be explained, even in part, by the justices’ supposed 
professional obligation to resolve all outstanding doctrinal tensions in the case law, heedless of 
the real world implications of such a course. He verges on claiming that the Scott majority 
worried only about doctrinal messiness and not about the precise state of the sectional crisis in 
1857. Quoting David Potter’s suggestion that, as intense as the political crisis was, it did not 
constantly distract people from their personal and professional affairs, he then argues that that 
observation “may apply to the Taney Court as well” (Allen 2006, 136). He explains, “By 1857, 
internal debates taking place among the justices had effectively boxed in the court to such an 
extent that its rulings in Dred Scott appeared both unavoidable and absolutely necessary” (136). 
By this, Allen refers not just to debates in the slavery cases but to doctrinal difficulties in a wide 
range of cases that “had simply destroyed any possible mechanism the court could have had to 
evade the case’s controversial aspects” (136). Especially, he suggests that the continuing 
dissatisfaction of a three-justice minority on the question of corporate citizenship in diversity 
cases somehow created the necessity that the majority “break” that minority’s “challenge” (136). 
Nothing adequately addresses the simple argument that the justices actually were national 
politicians in a very important sense, not just average people going about their affairs, and that 
the justices could indeed have avoided many of the controversial questions in the case with little 
doctrinal sweat.  That is, Allen has not adequately incorporated a basic insight of the 
constitutional politics school. 
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 Still, Allen’s close readings of the Scott opinions provide a number of valuable 
correctives to the current orthodoxy. Allen is especially strong in his evaluation of Taney and 
Curtis on the question of the Scotts’ citizenship and thus their eligibility to sue in federal court. 
 To read Allen’s book, then, is to be reminded that an internal doctrinal history is bound to 
be too limited. The Scott case was, of course, deeply political. But that does not mean that the 
Scott majority was a partisan caucus. The core function of the Court--its paradigmatically 
judicial function--is to decide cases and to perpetuate the authority of law, not to set policy or 
dictate to the other branches. At the same time, of course, all commentators recognize that 
judicial decision making in a case like Scott is a mix of law and politics. In this context, the key 
question to ask is whether there was something about the judges’ inescapably political judgments 
that rendered the majority’s action unjudicial, a mere partisan polemic. 
 If an internal doctrinal history can never be enough to account for a case like Scott, then 
what is needed is something more like the approach of the constitutional politics scholars, among 
whom Mark Graber is a major figure. Like Allen, Graber seeks to rehabilitate the Scott Court, 
but his 2006 book takes a very different route. Although he has plenty to say about doctrine, he is 
more concerned with situating the Court in the larger politics of the Constitution. This approach 
has been employed by a number of political scientists, historians, and legal scholars in recent 
years to show that an effective understanding of American constitutionalism must fully 
appreciate the courts’ complicated interactions with political institutions of all kinds (Fisher and 
Devins 1992; Whittington 2007, 1999; Leonard 2002, 2001; Kramer 2004). These institutions 
might include branches and agencies of government, political parties, unions, business 
organizations, special interests of various kinds, as well as popular movements and the electorate 
as such. Writers in this area identify significantly political aspects of the courts and substantial 
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influence running from the so-called political branches to the courts. But they also see 
meaningful legal limits on what courts do, influence running back from the courts to the political 
branches, and great salience for legalistic and constitutional thinking on important political 
questions even outside the courts. Graber approaches Scott, then, as a problem in the 
development of a broad constitutional politics after 1787. There is little determinate in the 
specifically judicial doctrine that constitutional politics generates. In Graber’s account, Taney’s 
and Curtis’s doctrinal efforts in Scott appear about equally judicial because they are about 
equally well grounded in the necessarily political development of the Constitution. 
 For Graber, once one understands constitutional law’s indeterminate and pragmatic 
qualities and thus its persistent dependence on a more general constitutional politics, Scott 
becomes just a dramatic example of the typical processes of constitutional adjudication. The 
Constitution that the Court routinely confronts does not represent a fixed, substantive principle 
(e.g., liberty) but a mechanism for compromising even the most deeply held principles of a 
pluralist society. The Court thus resolves cases under the authority of both the indeterminate 
constitutional text that anchors society’s most important settlements and the imperatives of 
constitutional politics that adjust those settlements through time. Nothing unjudicial about that, 
he suggests. These decisions, of course, have political qualities, but they have legal qualities too.  
And it is these recognizably legal qualities that entitle them to a kind of authority, a judicial 
authority, that plays a special role in tempering conflicts among groups that hold incompatible 
values (slaveholders and Free-Soilers then, pro-choice and pro-life activists now, for example). 
Thanks to the judiciary as such, American history is marked more by repeated peaceful 
submission to the latest evolution of the constitutional settlement and less by secession, civil 
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violence, or even crude majoritarianism. 12 
 Of course, Scott conspicuously failed to have this pacifying effect, and perhaps Graber’s 
chief objective is to show why it might have been best for all concerned to bow to its authority 
rather than resorting to violence. Thus, Graber (2006) moves beyond his impressive 
rehistoricization of Scott to attempt an even grander point about “constitutional evil.” He 
suggests that Taney’s opinion might actually have been the right decision--not so much 
doctrinally as politically. That is, Taney might have been right to suppose that, however evil 
slavery was, the practical price of attempting to eliminate it through federal action--in dead 
soldiers and any number of other consequences of a civil war that might have entrenched rather 
than eliminated slavery--was even greater.  Or, as Graber writes on the final pages of the book, it 
might have been better to vote for the “peace” candidate John Bell in 1860 rather than for the 
champion of “justice,” as Graber imagines Lincoln, because, as a general matter, “just causes are 
better realized by persuasion than by force” (253).   
 The logic of the argument is that constitutions exist to create political structures and 
dynamics by which society’s inevitable “evils” are rendered sufficiently tolerable that political 
disagreement does not constantly devolve into violence. On one level, nothing could be more 
obvious: a constitution, written or otherwise, substitutes a widely embraced structure of politics 
and law for the violence that would otherwise settle large-scale disagreements. On another level, 
it is empty: this truism about constitutions tells us nothing about whether any particular “evil” or, 
more usefully, any particular clash of values, represents the sort of disagreement that politics and 
law can rightly compromise and resolve, or, alternatively, the rare kind that is worth fighting and 
                                                 
12 Cf. Leonard (2007) which analyzes Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.’s account of criminal law and explicates 
that Civil War veteran’s view of law as profoundly political and partial, yet profoundly necessary to 
preserve “civilization” (i.e., peace) as against the violence pregnant in more overtly political modes of 
policymaking. 
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dying over. Had Graber taken on the daunting challenge of proving empirically that the 
continued accommodation of slavery would have been somehow better than the stout resistance 
that finally contributed to the horrific Civil War, then his meditations on “constitutional evil” 
would have been more compelling. As is, they only muddy his achievement--to which I now 
return--in developing a brilliant history of constitutional politics that might rehabilitate the 
reviled Taney. 
 
The Constitutional Politics of Slavery, 1787-1857 
 Beyond Graber’s pointed Scott revisionism, there lies a valuable collection of recent 
studies of the politico-constitutional status of slavery between 1787 and 1861. These histories 
make clear how completely the celebrated Constitution incorporated a commitment to slavery, 
both in 1787 and more importantly in its evolution across succeeding decades. Together with 
Graber, they point to a new and genuinely historical accounting of Scott. 
 One implication of this work is that, as Graber argues, the Founders simply had no 
clearly agreed settlement in mind for most of the particular questions that would come up in 
Scott. The goals of the Constitution had much more to do with setting up governmental 
institutions and a political process than with establishing precise, substantive rules of 
constitutional law. The Constitution offered a foundation for an ongoing constitutional politics, a 
document of frequently indeterminate rules that would have to be refined through practice. And 
it would not take long for politicians to establish the predominance of evolving practice in 
establishing the meaning of the Constitution.13 
                                                 
13  This point is well established by David Currie’s (2005) nearly comprehensive treatment of the 
period’s constitutional debates in his Constitution in Congress series. Although Currie asserts that 
everyone at the time was an “originalist,” in fact practically all his evidence demonstrates 
contemporaries’ belief that it was evolving practice that most often fixed constitutional meaning. 
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 The initial, rough understanding on the question of slavery in 1787, according to Graber, 
was simply that the institution would never be abolished without the consent of the slaveholding 
states. Although he offers little direct evidence of such an agreement, it is uncontroversial to note 
that the Constitution accommodated slavery in a number of ways, the fugitive slave and three-
fifths clauses being the most obvious and decisive, and that only the most marginal figures in 
American public life ever thought that the national government was empowered to abolish 
slavery in the states. Lacy Ford (2008) argues similarly that difficult negotiations in Philadelphia 
on particular issues like the international slave trade rested on an “unwritten constitutional 
understanding” (98). That understanding comprised both Southern agreement that slavery was a 
“problem”--an unfortunate institution that the South must eventually leave behind--and Northern 
agreement “to allow the political leaders of the states most involved with slavery to guide its 
future course” (98). This understanding that the South would find a way to emancipate itself 
from slavery rested on pure hope and crossed fingers, since no one had a realistic plan for ending 
slavery. Still, such an agreement might reasonably inform the constitutional interpretations made 
by subsequent actors, judicial or otherwise, in particular cases like Scott, even as it could hardly 
provide clear, mechanical answers. Only subsequent constitutional history, in and out of court, 
could provide real resolution.    
 For these and other reasons, then, it seems clear that more than one interpretation of the 
constitutional settlement might prove plausible. It was fair for some to characterize the 
Constitution as a guarantee to the slave states that slavery would remain their problem, never a 
liability for them in national politics. As suggested above, though, it was also widely imagined at 
the Founding that slavery might wither away on its own. Thus the Constitution’s arguably 
reluctant accommodations of the institution did not necessarily mean that the national 
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government could not move against slavery in any way.  Many in 1787 might have anticipated 
the achievement of an emancipated future partly though national authority to limit slavery’s 
geographic reach so as to encourage its withering.  But any such hopeful types would also have 
had to reckon with the clear probability that slavery would expand in the near term and even that 
such expansion would be demanded as a matter of right (Hammond 2007). At the Convention, 
George Mason recognized that, “The Western people are already calling out for slaves for their 
new lands,” thus making slave expansion inevitable, in his eyes, if the international slave trade 
were not promptly closed (Ford 2008, 98). The conflicts in Scott were well foreshadowed by the 
facts already on the ground in 1787 or shortly thereafter, and it seems impossible to say that the 
writers and ratifiers of the Constitution came to any clear agreement about how that conflict 
should be resolved. 
 Moreover, it was not only the South that was involved in entrenching slavery in the face 
of wishful emancipationist rhetoric. Already in 1787 and increasingly in the nineteenth century, 
Southern slavery was deeply interwoven with the economies and thus the collective lives of 
many communities outside the South and the national community itself. These communities 
were already on a capitalist trajectory that, as it happened, rested on Southern slavery. As Adam 
Rothman (2005) writes, “Forced labor did not merely precede transnational capitalist networks 
of commodity exchange. It was also enmeshed in those networks as they proliferated around the 
world in the nineteenth century” (223).  Slavery was not just recognized in the Constitution and 
practiced in the South, but its effects pervaded the society for which that Constitution was made. 
Thus, whatever constitutional material an opponent of slavery might have cited to justify 
limitations on the institution, any realistic observer had to anticipate an indefinite future for 
slavery both on the ground and in the Constitution.   
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 The point, then, is that a diversity of Founding-era views hovered about the 
Constitution’s slave texts, including some strongly grounded views that the slave states would 
retain control over slavery’s destiny. As Graber argues, that generation certainly did not 
contemplate the precise facts that emerged by the end of the War of 1812 and that would 
condition American politics all the way to the Civil War: a majority North threatening a firmly 
proslavery South with abolition and political oblivion (Graber 2006, 91-114; Mason 2006, 28-
31). And fantasies of a peaceful path to a slave-free society never really stood up to the reality 
that the world’s only popular government would for the foreseeable future remain a 
“slaveholding republic” (Fehrenbacher and McAfee 2001). 
 This general picture is not really much different in the end from Fehrenbacher’s 1978 
sketch of the Founding. His Scott tome drew out the Constitution’s ambiguities, its obfuscations, 
and the inadequate attention paid to the problem of slavery by the Framers. And he developed 
the critical importance of post-Founding history for giving real meaning to the incomplete 
settlement of 1787-1789 (Fehrenbacher 1978, chapters 1 and 2; Fehrenbacher and McAfee 
2001). Others do the same. David Lightner (2006), for example, offers some reinforcement for 
this general position in his argument that the Founders never confronted the question of whether 
the commerce clause might give Congress power to abolish or hinder the interstate slave trade 
(chapter 2). In fact, that question was never really resolved but remained a constitutional issue 
negotiated in court and in the political arena for the rest of the antebellum years (Lightner 2006). 
 In Graber’s summation, then, the years after 1787 brought a growing recognition of the 
slave states’ right to a kind of sectional equality in the Union, an equality that implied firm 
protection for slavery against any national effort to abolish the institution, even as the dream of 
gradual withering persisted with equal strength. Any number of recent works on the period agree 
  22  
that the ambiguities of 1787 persisted for a good while. A relatively fluid set of regional and 
sectional alignments only yielded a strong North-South sectionalism after a generation of 
slavery’s expansion through the southwest, the War of 1812, and especially in the course of the 
Missouri crisis of 1819-1821 (Onuf 1983; Rothman 2005; Lightner 2006; Mason 2006; 
Hammond 2007).14  The Northwest Ordinance of 1787, enacted under the Articles of 
Confederation and reaffirmed early in the new Congress, barred slavery from a huge territory 
with broad Southern support.  This Southern acceptance of a federal limitation on slavery’s 
expansion reflected, in part, the slave states’ self-interest in preventing the northwest from 
competing in the production of staple crops and, in part, the separate desire to support expansion 
of the republic (Onuf 1983, 169-71; Freehling 1990, 138). Of course, such expansionism soon 
produced the Southwest Ordinance of 1790, which contemplated a vast territory open to slavery. 
The Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 reaffirmed slaveholders’ rights to their human property, and the 
Louisiana Purchase of 1803 added more slave territory. On the other hand, the international slave 
trade was abolished at the first opportunity, although again with substantial Southern support, not 
against Southern resistance. Then the Missouri controversy of 1819-1821 unleashed a far more 
aggressively antislavery North than had previously revealed itself. At the same time, a number of 
Southerners, including James Madison himself, now denied that the Constitution authorized 
Congress to close any of the nation’s territories to slaveholding, despite the precedent of the 
Northwest Ordinance (Hammond 2007, chs. 4, 8; Mason 2006, 197-204; Fehrenbacher 1978, 
110).   
 In Graber’s account, approval of the Missouri Compromise became possible only when 
enough Southerners decided to “waive” their claimed constitutional right of equal access to all 
                                                 
14  And even then it is clear that other regional and sectional rivalries were as important as the one 
between the slave states and the free for some years to come.  See Daniel Feller (1984) on the public 
lands in the 1820s and 1830s, and James Roger Sharp (1970) on the banking question in the 1830s. 
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territories in return for the admission of Missouri and an implicit recognition of Southern 
equality (Graber 2006, 125).  Moreover, John Craig Hammond (2007) argues that the Southern 
readiness to waive this “right” was motivated in part by a conviction that the ban on slaveholders 
would never actually be enforced--that when the territories were actually settled and readied for 
organization, the status of slavery in those areas would be addressed afresh. Of course, this 
prediction was fully borne out by the Kansas-Nebraska Act, the 1854 congressional repeal of the 
ban on slavery in these territories (161-68). Thus, only through the rocky enactment of the 
Missouri Compromise did it become clear that there existed a North and a South in a durable 
competition; that this competition had turned to the South’s disadvantage with the permanent, 
unexpected shift of population dominance northward; but that the South was ready to insist that 
the spare language of the Constitution must imply a permanent guarantee of the constitutional 
equality of slaveholders’ rights in the nation’s territories.   
 The North as a whole would never embrace this Southern principle. Harboring some 
strong Southern sympathizers, it mostly nurtured various theories of how the Constitution might 
allow the North to keep slavery at arm’s length, perhaps leading ultimately to abolition but 
mainly preserving the North’s right to pursue its own interests without having to confront the 
despised and feared institution too directly. For the next forty years, the nation’s constitutional 
politics constantly readjusted the compromise between Southern demands for sectional equality 
and Northern insistence that the Constitution did not require it to accommodate slaveholders at 
every turn. Recognizing its firm status as the minority section of the Union after 1820, the South 
began to insist on institutional mechanisms to preserve slave-state equality. Anything less would 
fatally impair the essential property rights of citizens of the slave states and the fundamentals of 
those states’ social, economic, and political structures. In 1787, the three-fifths clause and 
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perhaps the fugitive slave clause had seemed adequate to the job. Even with the Northwest 
Ordinance standing as a conspicuous exception, Southerners constructed a narrative of 
slaveholders’ “rights” out of the reality of slavery’s persistent expansion from the Founding 
through the Missouri crisis (Hammond 2007). But now protection of such rights seemed to 
require new mechanisms, such as equality of representation in the Senate. Many Southerners 
denied that slavery could be excluded from the territories, but, failing Northern acceptance of 
that principle, at least they insisted that new states enter the Union in pairs. The South would 
thereby retain half the Senate seats and veto power over any serious legislative incursion on 
Southern rights (Graber 2006, 137-53). 
 In just a few years’ time, however, protection for the South would come to depend less on 
this balance rule and more on the emergence of national party organizations. When the national 
Democratic Party emerged in the 1830s as a permanent institution, it evinced a commitment in 
all regions of the country to the protection of Southern slavery, including some ill-defined scope 
for geographical expansion. The South had gained what would be its most important weapon 
right through the 1850s, and that was only sharpened in combat with the Whig Party, which itself 
defended slavery as often as it attacked it (144-48).   
 Through the early 1850s, the constitutional politics of slavery largely vindicated Southern 
principles--but never comfortably. For example, starting in the 1830s, the House of 
Representatives for years maintained a gag rule that prevented acknowledgement of even the 
existence of antislavery petitions addressed to the House, lest the least respect be paid to the 
enemies of the South’s essential institution. While that policy provoked some heated opposition, 
the real test of Southern power came in the 1840s as sentiment for territorial expansion heated 
up. The Democratic Party was then compelled to consider the precise scope of its commitment to 
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Southern rights as it contemplated the seizure from Mexico of Texas, California, and most of the 
land in between. The necessity of executing a slavery policy in these territories brought out 
sectional stresses in both parties, but especially the dominant Democrats. David Wilmot and 
other Northern Democrats in the House had already detected a growing, pro-Southern imbalance 
of power in the party, beginning at least as early as the South’s refusal to permit renomination of 
former president Martin Van Buren in 1844. Faced with the concrete problem of governing new 
territories, Wilmot introduced his famous 1846 Proviso, which would have banned slavery from 
any territory acquired in the Mexican War (Freehling 1990, 458-59). 
 This challenge to the South opened intermittent sectional wars within the parties that 
would last until secession itself. But throughout those years, the main force that delayed 
secession was the persistence of the Democratic Party as a nationalizing force. In territorial crisis 
after territorial crisis, that party managed to satisfy its sectional wings just well enough to hold 
together. By the early 1850s, the Whigs were moribund, but the Democrats had managed to 
survive the Compromise of 1850, which formally opened the new territories of the Mexican 
Cession to slavery, and the repeal of the Missouri Compromise in the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 
1854. All of this history uneasily protected the South from serious inroads on slavery. As 
importantly, it preserved the South’s belief that, though it had become the minority section, it 
retained such constitutional status and leverage that it could continue to defend its equal “rights” 
even if abolitionism seemed always at the doorstep (Graber 2006, 148-59; Holt 1978; Leonard 
2002, 252-66). 
 
Slave Society and the Constitution 
 As is generally the case with work in the “constitutional politics” school, the preceding 
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account of constitutional development goes beyond the courts to the political arena, but only 
gestures at the social history that must underlie any political history of the Constitution. The 
sources of constitutional meaning and doctrine, however, are even broader and deeper than a 
short political history of the period, including this one, can demonstrate. But a look at the 
insightful work of William Freehling and others on the development of Southern principles helps 
explain not only the political but the social underpinnings of constitutional development. 
Freehling’s new volume (2007) of his Road to Disunion joins his first volume (1990) in 
ruthlessly uncovering the social pathologies of a “democratic” slaveholding society, connecting 
those pathologies to sectional politics, and using that context to illuminate the nature of the Scott 
majority. Other recent writing, too, sustains Freehling’s perspective and provides the critical 
reader with further reason to question the picture of Taney as the leader of a partisan caucus. 
 In Freehling’s account, the fundamental and active humanity of the enslaved is so 
objectively inconsistent with their status as property as to undermine their masters’ declared 
commitment to democracy. This unsurprising point, though, must be connected to the equally 
true point that Southern slaveholders and nonslaveholders alike honestly venerated notions of 
political equality and civil liberty and believed them applicable to a much larger swath of the 
population--the nonenslaved white men--than practically any society before. The ambition both 
to sustain a genuinely democratic society among white men and to deny even the first hints of 
liberty and democracy to a large part of the total population may have seemed achievable in the 
abstract, but in practice, of course, it proved impossible. That was because the enslavement of 
humans, unlike the ownership of all sorts of other chattels, created the ever-present threat of 
bloody insurrection and a consequent web of suspicion and duplicity.   
 There was the ever-present reality of duplicity on the part of the not-yet-revolting slaves, 
  27  
a duplicity that the slaveholders alternately denied and feared. There was the self-deception on 
the part of the “democratic” and ostensibly benevolent owners, who actually and necessarily 
focused much of their energy on sustaining systems of coercion. There was the suspicion among 
the slaveholders that their nonslaveholding neighbors did not fully endorse their property rights 
in human beings and would not maintain the society-wide discipline necessary to prevent 
insurrection. Finally, even slaveholders themselves often harbored doubts about the justifiability 
of an institution that they relied on and profited from but also feared, with no clear way of 
shedding the institution (so they universally insisted) and no comfortable way of holding on to it. 
Nearly always, the profitability of slavery overcame both their moral scruples and the 
widespread anxiety that followed each of the many insurrections that actually occurred. But 
those uprisings lay on a continuum with the daily evidence of the duplicity at the foundation of 
the slaveholding republics. Together, they stoked the fear that antislavery sentiment among 
whites would slip out, become uncontained, make its way to the always revolt-ready enslaved, 
and open the door to the insurrection that all expected (Freehling 2007, 1994; Ford 2008). 
 If all this were not enough, Northern pressure intensified Southern combustibility. Thus, 
even if (as was the case) some Southerners were prepared to discuss ways to ameliorate the 
institution and inch toward abolition, the presence of an antislavery majority (or even minority) 
in the North got in the way. Lacy Ford (2008) offers the example of William Cabell Rives, who 
carried the tradition of earnest but futile regret about slavery far into the age of Southern-rights 
extremism: “As late as 1857, Rives believed that slavery would gradually disappear ‘under the 
influence of a humane and enlightened public opinion’ in the South if, and only if, ‘national 
agitation’ of the issue ‘could be made to cease’” (121). The antislavery Northerners in the 
imagination of the South were not just the small minority of avowed “abolitionists.” They 
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included as well the large numbers that seemed merely to tolerate slavery in the Union rather 
than embracing slaveholding rights as the equal of all other property rights. Exhibit A on this 
score was the Wilmot Proviso of 1846. As noted above, this proposal would have barred slavery 
from the Mexican Cession and seemed to threaten a permanent end to the expansion of the 
South’s essential institution. Critically, the Proviso was introduced not by declared abolitionists 
but by Democratic regulars, the indispensable bulwark of Southern rights in the North15 
(Freehling 1990, 458-62; Maltz 2007a, 42-45, 81-82; Leonard 2002, 253-54). 
 Southern Democrats reacted with stunned surprise when their Northern brothers thus 
declared Southern inferiority. As Earl Maltz (2007a) reports, the Van Burenite regular Democrat 
Peter Daniel, who would become the most extreme Southerner on the Scott Court, appeared a 
moderate and trusting voice until the Wilmot Proviso, which, he wrote to Van Buren, “declares 
to me that I am not regarded as an equal” (82). Similarly, Alabama’s John Archibald Campbell, a 
highly regarded lawyer writing years before his nomination to the Court, articulated the Southern 
conviction that “slavery is the central point about which Southern society is formed. It was so 
understood at the formation of the Constitution…. We must have an organization of the territory 
that admits us as equals” (84). The same story can be told of Chief Justice Taney. As James 
Simon (2006) argues, Taney held pretty consistent views of slavery. As firmly racist as most of 
his contemporaries, he nevertheless detested slavery and emancipated and supported the slaves 
he had inherited. He defended the rights of antislavery speakers--as long as the speaker stopped 
short of “disturb[ing] the peace and order of society” (11)--in his courtroom defense of an 
antislavery minister in 1819. A few years later, as attorney general, he argued with perfect 
                                                 
15  Imagine as well the Southern Democratic horror when Martin Van Buren himself, the man who 
practically invented transsectional Democratic organization with no moral qualms about slavery, bolted 
the party and accepted the “abolitionist” Free Soil nomination in 1848. He did so not because he had any 
sympathy for abolitionists, but as a way of resisting Southern engrossment of power within the 
Democratic Party (Maltz 2007a; Freehling 1990; Leonard 2002). 
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consistency that African Americans were nevertheless ineligible for citizenship. His all too 
common racism well accommodated both the wrongness of slavery and a refusal to see African 
Americans as members of Taney’s own constitutional family. Widely praised as one of the great 
chief justices for his work before Scott, Taney in the 1840s took a constitutional position that 
was fully consistent with his long held beliefs. He  
bristled at the condescending attitude of northern politicians toward the South and their 
assumption that they were morally superior to southerners. And he was steadfast in his 
belief that the framers had made a binding constitutional pact between the North and 
South that entitled the states to determine for themselves whether slavery would live or 
die. (94-95) 
 
 Notwithstanding the crucial importance of the Wilmot Proviso in giving new salience to 
sectional tensions generally, none of the main Southern arguments and sentiment of the 1840s 
was fundamentally new. John Craig Hammond (2007) makes clear that all the central arguments 
were already in place in many Southern minds by the time of the Missouri Compromise in 1820: 
that the Constitution explicitly recognized property rights in slaves, that slavery could not be 
prohibited anywhere except by the consent of the affected political community, that the 
Northwest Ordinance was a usurpation, that slaveholding was a “right” everywhere in the United 
States but where a full-fledged state government had prohibited it, and that therefore the 
Missouri Compromise could never be enforced (161-68).  Similarly, Matthew Mason (2006) 
develops the evidence that even before the Missouri crisis, Southern society lived with a constant 
and well-founded fear of insurrection just below the surface of daily life, a fear that underlay the 
Southern readiness to treat every Northern move to restrict slaveholding as an invitation to 
insurrection and as an unconstitutional step in the direction of “universal emancipation” (also see 
Ford 2008; Wolf 2006). 
 Thus did Northerners persistently provoke Southern intransigence on slavery questions 
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simply by insisting on what they thought was a fair territorial policy, especially in light of the 
manifest immorality of slavery.  Thus did Southerners--even those who shared something of that 
opposition to slavery in the abstract--recoil at the North’s persistent intimations of Southern 
inferiority as long as slavery survived. More than this, Northerners inspired a constant ratcheting 
up of political orthodoxy inside the South, gradually increasing the number of Southerners who 
felt compelled to defend slavery as a positive good. As the Democratic and Whig Parties 
competed with each other to prove their reliability on slavery, public discourse suggested that 
anything less than a full bore defense of slavery might be a step toward the entire society’s 
suicide.   
 The result was a society of boiling internal contradictions that increasingly suppressed 
free speech in the name of democracy.  In the Southern mind, slavery grew more and more 
fundamental to southern civilization. Increasingly, a controlling culture emerged that ruled out 
public talk of abolition and demanded close scrutiny of every national measure that might touch 
slavery. To allow free speech on the subject of abolition was ostensibly to risk the self-
immolation of Southern society. To allow the national government to relegate one set of states to 
inequality violated basic principles of democracy.   
 All of this internal tension was intensified even further by the condition of the border 
states. Here, Freehling (2007) tells us, slavery seemed always on the verge of disintegration 
through some combination of runaways to an intrusive North, emancipations, domestic political 
challenge by the large nonslaveholding majority, and the steady selling of slaves southward. All 
of this created the prospect that slavery would become ever more narrowly isolated in a small 
minority of states and thus increasingly at the mercy of the antislavery majority in the nation. In 
this condition, each instance of condemnation and condescension from the North provoked 
  31  
another episode in “a touchy civilization’s enraged spree of self-justification” (17). 
 It is essential to recognize that Southern society was, of course, not democratic by 
modern standards, no matter how persistently Southerners declared their commitment to 
democratic values. Although the North, too, was far from democratic by modern standards--
given its disfranchisement of most of its adult population, its pervasive subordination of African 
Americans, and many other defects--even many Southerners recognized that slavery was a 
problem for a “democratic” society. But to Southerners, the more important point was that 
slavery had to be recognized as their problem. At a visceral level, they understood the 
Constitution as protection from outsiders who might “solve” their problems at the price of 
economic devastation, race war, and subordination of the white South to the white North. 
 
Scott in the Stream of Constitutional History 
 Against this background, the Scott case comes to look quite different from its usual 
portrayal. It becomes no longer an aggressive move by proslavery diehards but a fierce bid by 
Southern moderates to preserve the Union.  Moreover, it becomes preeminently a defense of law 
just when law most matters: when a majority is poised to destabilize an entire society, heedless 
of the consequences that only a targeted minority will have to bear. These justices and the 
segments of Southern opinion they reflected were not in the extremist, secessionist camp, but 
ranged from the nonslaveholding border state man, Taney, to those who were more deeply 
enmeshed in slave society but filled with the common doubts about the slave system (Freehling 
2007, 110-13). Only Justice Daniel exhibited extremist tendencies and only after the Wilmot 
Proviso (Maltz 2007a, 78-83).  Most of the Southern justices shared the extremists’ insistence on 
the full equality of the Southern states, slavery and all. But, unlike the extremists, they seem to 
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have harbored a range of doubts about slavery itself (Freehling 2007). Generally devoted to the 
Union, they continued to insist that the profound problems created by the enslavement of human 
beings could only be dealt with by the South in its own way. And the South could do that only if 
the law of the Constitution guaranteed the South’s security against those with no direct stake in 
Southern society.   
 This security must imply a firm recognition of Southern rights to both slavery and 
equality within the Union, rights that at that level of abstraction were readily identifiable with the 
Constitution of 1787. At that same level of abstraction, the Southern justices could understand 
the competing interest of the North in maintaining its slave-free version of democratic society. 
But the devil was in particular cases, including court cases like Scott, for which the original 
Constitution supplied no clear directive (Zuckert 2007). And, while such cases were bound to be 
influenced by the justices’ preexisting partialities, recent writing indicates that the Southern 
justices were not pursuing anything so crude as a proslavery agenda. Rather, the Southern 
majority on the Court sought to resist the intrusions of an increasingly “abolitionist” North, to 
reassure Southerners that they remained equals in the American democracy, to equip moderates 
to resist extremists in the name of Union, and even to keep alive the hope that the South might 
ameliorate the institution of slavery and--perhaps only for the dreamers--one day find a peaceful 
road to abolition.   
 By 1857 the Southern moderate position indeed constituted a “partisan” view of the 
Constitution, but so did every position. The Southern moderate view accommodated a heinous 
institution, but it recognized that the sin lay originally in the Constitution itself and in 
innumerable prior decisions, each of which rested on the irreversible social history of slavery. It 
was a view that sought to avoid other towering evils: the failure of the democratic experiment 
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and a horrific civil war. It was also a view that had plenty of legal foundation. As “political” as 
every justice’s motivations were, certainly including the motivation to secure the South some 
breathing room and autonomy, it was also true that these motivations were readily translatable 
into constitutional rights: where do Court-declared rights come from but readings of the 
constitutional text within the context of the federated politics that the Constitution engendered?  
If the question was whether Sanford retained a right of ownership in the Scotts, and if that 
question rested on the meaning of Article III, the territories clause, the new states clause, the due 
process clause, the privileges and immunities clause, and the broader underlying theories and 
purposes of the Constitution, where was the answer to that legal question to be found? The 
ambiguities of those provisions certainly had to be resolved in part by some realistic assessment 
of how such a Constitution might actually achieve its purposes, unavoidably taking into account 
both its adopters’ suppositions and its subsequent history right through to 1857. 
 And yet the “moderation” of these mostly Unionist judges was expressed with a ferocity 
that has not helped them win a sympathetic audience among historians or other scholars. Taney 
earned no Northern friends by insisting that the slavery ban in the Missouri Compromise “could 
hardly be dignified with the name of due process of law” (Scott, 450). The ferocity, though, was 
natural enough. It was the ferocity of moderates who encountered what they took to be 
treasonous views that were spreading rapidly through the North. Still, the moderates’ indignant 
rhetoric only encouraged Northerners in their inability to distinguish a Southern moderate from a 
Southern “ultra,” since both sorts of Southerner seemed to insist on such protection for slavery as 
to sacrifice Northern equality and civil liberty.   
 Of course, some will object to the whole notion that a few decades of self-interested and 
partisan politics could legitimately be said to have altered what might count as genuinely legal 
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arguments in the Supreme Court. And they might point to Taney’s own strategy in Scott of 
emphasizing his originalism, the supposedly unchanging quality of constitutional meaning 
through which he defended the legal character of his opinion (Eisgruber 1993). It is necessary, 
therefore, to turn finally to the Scott opinions themselves. The foregoing history of slavery and 
the Constitution outside the courts will provide the necessary context for close doctrinal analysis 
of Taney’s and Curtis’s efforts. And that analysis will illuminate the difference between judging 
and unjudicial usurpation at the moment when the justices faced their greatest temptation to cross 
that line. 
 
 
II.  THE OPINIONS 
 The objective of this second part is to take advantage of what I hope is the reader’s 
enhanced openness to rethinking the principal opinions in Scott. I have argued with Graber and 
others that the history of constitutional politics to 1857 left the South with a very plausible 
expectation that its interests might properly be vindicated in a court of law. At the same time, 
Northerners held a corresponding expectation that a slavery-limiting position might properly be 
vindicated in a case like Scott. These expectations were put to the test when two of the country’s 
best-reputed legal minds attempted to resolve judicially some of the great constitutional 
questions of the day. Did Taney, often remembered as one of the last defenders of slavery, really 
abandon his judicial role to crassly promote sectional interest at the expense of the Constitution? 
Did Curtis, a favorite of modern adherents of a postracist Constitution,16 really respond with a 
masterwork of legal craftsmanship? Perhaps, from their different perspectives, each man sought 
                                                 
16  It is well known that Justice John McLean was far more deeply and consistently opposed to 
slavery than was Curtis and lacked the latter’s full-on racism, but Curtis is generally thought the superior 
judicial craftsman and thus, in some respects, the greater hero in Scott. 
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only to judge in good faith, to sustain the power of law as an agent of peace in a time of looming 
violence. I conclude that, in the end, neither managed to wholly avoid the temptation to reach 
beyond the judicial role. Contrary to entrenched orthodoxy, however, it would appear that Taney 
devoted himself most thoroughly to vindicating the law, while Curtis may well be the one who 
succumbed to unjudicial temptation, abandoning the constraints of law and thus risking violence-
-for better or worse at this climactic juncture in the history of slavery--to resist the ascendancy of 
Southern slaveholders (if not really to oppose slavery itself).  
 To reach this conclusion, it is necessary to combine the larger history above with a close 
reading of the justices’ language. Judicial practice distinctively combines authoritative texts with 
historically situated moral, cultural, and policy judgments to construct the law, a law that must be 
recognizably directed at the resolution of discrete parties’ controversies, even as it exercises a 
clear, even deliberate, but highly indeterminate influence on public policy and political debate. 
When the Court does its work well, judicially but never apolitically, it has the potential--as 
Graber urges--to nudge the nation toward peaceful resolution of otherwise dangerous conflicts.  
 It seems clear in retrospect that the Court was in no position to save the nation from Civil 
War in Scott. It seems equally clear that the Scott decision was much less a cause of the Civil 
War than a “channel” through which the causal currents flowed (Fehrenbacher 1978, 3-4). Try as 
they might, the Scott justices had little hope of controlling so momentous a constitutional 
controversy. But, while Scott remains an important part of the political narrative of the 1850s, it 
also stands as an important episode in American legal history. In context, the evidence of the 
opinions suggests that Taney largely adhered to the law and to the judicial role, albeit under a 
racist, slavery-accommodating Constitution. Curtis, on the other hand, chose to be on the right 
side of history--or at least to resist the slaveholding aristocracy—by writing what he wished the 
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law was rather than what he could show it to be.  I come to that conclusion by analyzing several 
major aspects of the Taney and Curtis opinions, the last and most important of which is the 
difference between Taney’s treatment of the Strader precedent in Scott and Curtis’s failure to 
deal at all with that important case. 
 
Taney and Curtis on Citizenship 
 I’ll begin with the question of the Scotts’ Article III citizenship.  On this question, 
especially, scholars have thought Curtis the very model of a judge and Taney a cynical 
manipulator of the legal materials.  But Austin Allen has it nearly right when he says that, 
“Curtis’s dissent, despite its popularity among historians, represented little more than a failed 
attempt to produce an antislavery ruling within a hopelessly antiabolitionist legal structure” 
(Allen 2006, 176).  It would be more accurate to call it an “anti-southern” or “anti-slave-power” 
opinion within a “slavery-protective” legal structure, but I agree with Allen’s gist.   The question 
before the Court was whether any native-born person descended from African slaves could 
qualify as a “citizen” authorized to sue in diversity under Article III.  Taney, of course, answered 
in the negative. 
 The most common grounds for condemning Taney’s rejection of black citizenship are 
Curtis’s proofs that at least some states recognized black voting rights in 1787 (Scott, 572-76), 
thus showing at least that blacks could be state citizens.  But it is well known that many aliens 
possessed voting rights in this period (Keyssar 2000, Graber 2006).  Possession of the franchise 
did not make them citizens.  Presumably, the franchise has some significant relationship to 
citizenship, but it is and was a problematic one.  Oddly, even Curtis’s fans often don’t mention 
that Curtis did confront this problem in his dissent. Allen, though, does give Curtis that much 
credit while nevertheless demonstrating the weaknesses in Curtis’s imaginative doctrine of 
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citizenship (Allen 2006, 169-177).  Curtis met the issue by combining nativity and the 
franchise—neither consideration on its own being adequate to prove citizenship.  He thus 
produced a novel rule that nativity in a particular state combined with that state’s choice to grant 
one the franchise must be taken as proof of one’s status as a state citizen and thus, for Curtis, an 
Article III “citizen” (Scott, 576-83).   
 Curtis seems to have made this rule up.  He did not make it up out of whole cloth, and 
perhaps it was a reasonable rule.  But if it was, that was only because the Constitution had 
manifestly failed to establish what constituted Article III citizenship (Graber 2006), leaving the 
question implicitly to be answered by judicial creativity. Curtis argued fairly enough that the 
Constitution anticipated that some persons would gain citizenship by means of native birth, but 
not everyone.  What further requirements might apply?  Curtis asserted there were only four 
possibilities (Scott, 577).  But none of his possibilities fully accounted for the racism that 
underlay much of American constitutional culture in 1787 and 1857 alike. His opinion never 
considered whether a universally oppressed class of persons, mostly reduced to property in many 
of the Founding states, might be an unlikely group to come within the category of “citizen.”  
Curtis moved rapidly to the conclusion that native citizenship was defined exclusively by the 
states because of the Constitution’s very failure to define citizenship and because of its 
references to citizens of states in a few spots (contexts where critical questions of interstate 
relations simply made that usage handy17) (Scott, 579-82). But, when reading a national compact 
that deliberately and carefully accommodated racist slavery on a massive scale, he should 
                                                 
17  For example, he pointed to the reference to “citizens of each state” in the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause as a strong indication that national citizenship was derivative of state citizenship.  But 
I don’t see the argument.  That clause is an order to the states not to discriminate against out-of-staters.  
(See further discussion below.)  In that context, it seems pretty natural to speak in terms of citizens of 
states, even though citizenship itself might be ultimately a matter of federal law.  And, in fact, it seems to 
me difficult to rewrite this ban on discrimination against out-of-state American citizens without referring 
to the protected as “citizens of each state” or something very like that. 
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certainly have considered that a firmly racist reading of the word “citizen”18 was the natural one 
to most Southerners and many Northerners.19 
 Given the indeterminacy of Article III, Taney was at least as well justified in pointing to 
the pervasive legal degradation of African Americans in every state in the nation, both in 1787 
and after (Scott, 407-421).  On this basis, he concluded that they could not have been 
contemplated as citizens for any national purpose.  For most blacks, of course, the substance of 
that degradation was enslavement, but even the free were commonly deprived of other central 
rights, like the right to serve on a jury, the right to serve in a militia, or the right to vote on equal 
terms with whites.  As he strongly implied (Scott, 422) and as Graber develops more fully (2006, 
51-52), the often similar political disabilities of women and children at the time would have 
struck nearly everyone as qualitatively different in socioconstitutional meaning from those 
imposed on blacks regardless of gender and age.  The absence of voting rights for women and 
children did not deprive them of citizenship.  And the possession of voting rights by a small 
minority of African Americans no more made that universally oppressed group eligible for legal 
citizenship than it did alien voters. 
 Further, Curtis’s evidence of actual black participation in the ratification of the 
Constitution was nil.  He usefully proved black eligibility to vote in several states, and it 
certainly seems likely that at least some blacks did actually vote.  But Curtis’s actual argument 
depended only on formal black eligibility and his assumption that this formal and local eligibility 
                                                 
18  Note also that, while a modern lawyer would likely seize on the ambiguity of the Constitution to 
conclude that the only legitimate reading must be an anti-racist one, it’s not as if Curtis actually rested his 
opinion on a rejection of racism.  He often expressed an ugly racism of his own (Streichler 2005).  He 
read the Constitution here to defend national power and Northern prerogative against Southern insistence 
on special rights, but not to embrace abolitionism or opposition to racism. 
19  Martin Van Buren, for example, in his Inquiry (1867, 356-58) objected to Taney’s ruling on the 
Missouri Compromise as a usurpation but expressed agreement with the holding on citizenship.  Graber 
also offers evidence that Curtis’s conclusions on the citizenship question were out of step with public and 
judicial opinion both North and South (Graber 2006, 28-30). 
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must have implied national citizenship at the Founding.  It is an important failure on his part, 
then, that he offered no evidence of anyone drawing the inference of black citizenship in this 
way circa 1787.  Nor did he offer any evidence that framers and ratifiers in any state attended to 
this question in any degree, much less that they understood it to be settled in favor of black 
citizenship. One natural inference, then, is that a tiny number of African Americans, conceivably 
none, were recognized by the white majority in a few states as participants in the Founding, even 
as white America more generally denied them the basic presumptions of equal dignity that one 
might think essential to citizenship. 
 Finally, Curtis argued that certain early congressional statutes, despite their racism, 
seemed to assume the possibility that blacks might be made citizens (Scott, 587).  This was a 
worthy argument,20 of course, but it and Curtis’s other arguments were readily neutralized by the 
mass of Taney’s evidence of black subordination (Scott, 407-421).  Nowhere did Curtis squarely 
confront Taney’s claim that constitutionally protected black citizenship would have conflicted 
with generally held racist assumptions and the requirements of the slaveholding states.  Nor did 
he even list that position among the possibilities that must “embrace the entire subject” in the 
Constitution (Scott, 577).   
 The point is sharpened, I think, by the following assertion of Curtis’s, with which we 
would all like to agree, but which must have befuddled what southern readers he had: “[T]hat 
[the Constitution] was made exclusively for the white race is, in my opinion, not only an 
assumption not warranted by anything in the Constitution, but contradicted by its opening 
                                                 
20  But not a very strong argument, really, since Taney never claimed that blacks could not be made 
citizens of the nation, only that African slaves and their descendants could not be made citizens.  Thus, 
responding in the formalistic mode that Curtis used here, one need only point out that the statutes that 
Curtis relied on, which used phrases like “white male citizen” (implying the possibility that there might 
be black citizens) could have been phrased that way on the assumption that there might exist black 
citizens by way of naturalization, even though there could not be citizenship among the emancipated or 
their descendants. 
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declaration, that it was ordained and established by the people of the United States, for 
themselves and their posterity” (Scott, 582).  For Curtis that unqualified phrase “the people of the 
United States” assumed a basic, though limited, equality of races.  But it is hard to imagine that 
more than a dwindling minority of Southerners read that phrase Curtis’s way at any time 
between 1787 and 1857.  Nor would Northerners have reliably agreed with him. Senator Stephen 
A. Douglas, for example, the most prominent Northern Democratic leader of the 1850s, was a 
frequent exponent of the position that the Constitution was made for the white race only 
(Johanssen 1973).  Since it is standard judicial practice to read specific meanings into general 
phrases, it hardly does Curtis credit as a judicial craftsman to ignore the plausibility of probably 
the dominant reading of the constitutional language at the time, insisting that only a reading 
pregnant with federal jurisdiction for freedom suits could be plausible.  
 Although I conclude with Allen and Graber that Taney’s opinion makes a much stronger 
argument than does Curtis’s on the citizenship question, I hesitate to suggest judicial bad faith on 
the basis of anything in this section of either man’s opinion. Taney simply judged that the most 
sensible meaning of the word “citizen” in a partly slaveholding and predominantly racist nation 
would not include African Americans.  Curtis responded with a kind of formalism that is often 
resorted to by judges.  But, in this case, such formalism could hardly claim such certainty in the 
legal sources as might overcome the real history of the nation and its Constitution.  
 
Taney and the Due Process Clause 
 In the second half of Taney’s opinion, the Chief Justice held that the Missouri 
Compromise’s exclusion of slavery from a large part of the territories violated property rights 
protected by the Due Process Clause of the national Constitution.  This part of the opinion is 
  41  
often condemned as, in effect, unjudicial and “partisan” for a variety of different reasons.  
Commonly, it is assumed to be dictum, since the prior discussion of citizenship had already 
determined the outcome of the case.  Fehrenbacher properly dismissed that argument years ago, 
accurately observing that this part of the opinion was simply an argument in the alternative on 
the question of jurisdiction.  I’ll have more to say on that below when I get to Curtis’s own 
accusations on that score.  Here, I want to discuss the charge by Fehrenbacher that Taney utterly 
failed as a judge in his attempt to apply what would come to be called substantive due process 
(Fehrenbacher 1978, 379-84). Fehrenbacher ridiculed Taney’s allegedly offhand and 
unelaborated reliance on the Due Process Clause. But I think I can show that Taney’s reasoning 
was much more elaborate and well founded than Fehrenbacher and others have wanted to allow. 
 The Surprising Strength of Taney’s Opinion 
 In the justices’ dispute about congressional power over slavery in the territories, Curtis 
emphasized that Congress had repeatedly exercised such a power over many decades, beginning 
with the Northwest Ordinance.  Taney, on the other hand, rested on the principle of state 
equality. Like Curtis, Taney fully embraced substantial governing power for Congress in the 
territories (though Taney controversially dismissed the territories clause as the source of that 
power in favor of the new states clause).21  The question was whether Congress’s power could 
                                                 
21  Taney has often been  condemned for his allegedly shoddy history regarding the original 
meaning of the territories clause.  These criticisms have contained a good deal of legitimacy even as 
they’ve ignored much of the plausibility of some of his arguments.  Coming to Taney’s defense, Allen 
(2006), for example, rightly points out that the courts were not bound by the common (but hardly 
unanimous) assumption that Congress had power over slavery in the territories.  Moreover, there were no 
judicial cases settling the question.  The American Insurance case of 1828, written by Chief Justice 
Marshall, certainly tended to support the claim that the territories clause conferred broad power on 
Congress over the Florida Territory and thus over pretty much any territory acquired by the United States.  
But, as quickly as Marshall’s opinion derived the power from the territories clause, he retracted that firm 
conclusion and declared that the power came either from that clause or from the inevitable rights of 
sovereignty over acquired territory.  26 U.S. 511, 542-43.  I read this as pretty strong evidence that 
Marshall personally thought the clause applied to Florida and implicitly would apply to all of the 
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extend specifically to excluding slave property.   
 Taney’s answer rested on the premise that the citizens of all states had equal rights to 
enjoy the national territories.  Perhaps no one would dispute that principle in the abstract, but 
how might it apply in this context?  To understand Taney’s perspective, it is necessary to recall 
Part I’s socioconstitutional portrait of the antebellum South, which emphasized that slavery and 
                                                 
Louisiana Purchase, but that he felt it necessary or wise to leave that question unsettled.  (I’m pretty 
convinced that he did so to accommodate Justice William Johnson, who had decided this same case below 
and had firmly rested congressional authority on the law of nations.  I infer that he would have refused to 
join Marshall’s opinion had it rested on the territories clause. 26 U.S. 511, 515 n.*.  Johnson had done a 
similar thing to Marshall in Fletcher v. Peck, refusing to allow Marshall to declare the unanimity of the 
Court unless Marshall rested the opinion on either the contracts clause or on Johnson’s preferred natural 
law rather than firmly on the contracts clause itself.  For Marshall’s compelled equivocation, see Fletcher 
v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 139 (1810), and for the Johnson demurral that forced the equivocation, see pp. 143-
45.)  In any case, Marshall did leave the question unsettled in American Insurance, though it is also fair to 
say that the case was more helpful to Taney’s opponents than to him. 
 More importantly, Taney very plausibly noted that the language of “rules” and “regulations” in 
the territories clause bore a close resemblance to those constitutional provisions granting limited, 
specified powers.  In contrast, that language was not very similar to the grant of plenary congressional 
power over the District of Columbia, which granted a power of “exclusive legislation in all cases 
whatsoever.”  He thus concluded that the territories clause responded to the specific 1787 challenge of 
how to manage the western lands then in the process of cession from several states.  It applied only to 
those territories, not the ones subsequently acquired in the Louisiana Purchase.  Consequently, the ban on 
slavery found in the Northwest Ordinance constituted no precedent as to the scope of constitutional 
authority for other territories. (Allen 2006, 182-89)   
 Taney’s argument is indeed a strong lawyer’s argument as far as it goes.  Its major weakness is 
not in his argument about which territories the clause applied to, but in his ignoring the implication that if 
Congress really did have the authority to regulate and even ban slavery under the territories clause, then it 
was certainly hard to see why it would not have that authority under the new states clause or under 
Marshall’s conception of the broad sovereign authority that Congress was assumed to possess over 
territories generally.  This failure on Taney’s part is not fatal to his argument by any means.  As far as I 
know, no one put this to him, and there might well have been good reason to conclude that the 
Convention meant for Congress to have power over slavery in the original territories of the western 
cessions but not thereafter.  After all, it was already clear in 1787 that the states collectively meant the 
new territories to harbor slavery to the south but not to the north; this understanding might fairly be read 
into the territories clause.  But that does not at all mean that there was any understanding that Congress 
should be able to determine for itself the fate of all territories that might appear in the future.  Moreover, 
had anyone put to Taney an argument that forced him to confront the history of territorial bans on slavery, 
he could of course simply have said that they were all unconstitutional, and there would have been no 
judicial precedent, only legislative, to trouble him.   
 See also Graber (2006, 66-76), who justly argues that, while Taney’s argument had some 
substantial grounding, the best conclusion is that the Framers had no clear intentions regarding territories 
beyond the western cessions. He insists again that constitutional meaning had to be and was understood to 
be settled by practice, which, for Graber, means that congressional power over slavery came to rest on a 
principle of southern consent to any restrictions on slavery. 
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all its tensions were fundamental to southern society.  Thus, for Taney, any responsible reading 
of the Constitution had to rest on a recognition of the real danger of insurrection, the 
consequently indispensable autonomy of the slave states on questions touching the future of 
slavery, and thus the fundamental equality of the slaveholding states, their right not to be 
discriminated against on federal matters by virtue of their slaveholding.  The lesson from 
Freehling and others is that Southerners took this understanding for granted.  Moreover, they 
took this understanding to be distinctly embraced in the Constitution’s embrace of slaveholding 
rights and protections for the slaveholding states.  For Taney, then, it could hardly be more 
obvious that territorial migrants’ slave property must be protected if state equality were to be 
protected.  Any practice to the contrary over the years constituted merely political compromises.  
Such compromises, he implicitly argued, could not establish a legal principle binding on the 
judiciary.  They might have their due influence, but they could not control the judiciary in a case 
of first impression.   
 Here is how Taney structured his argument. He began by announcing that he would 
consider “by what provision of the Constitution the present Federal Government…is authorized 
to acquire territory…and what powers it may exercise therein over the person or property of a 
citizen of the United States” (Scott, 446). He adopted the new states clause22 as the authority for 
acquiring and, of necessity, governing new territory. Then, he embraced a corollary of that 
position that would take him to the “common property” doctrine: “Whatever [the General 
Government] acquires, it acquires for the benefit of the people of the several States who created 
it. It is their trustee acting for them, and charged with the duty of promoting the interests of the 
                                                 
22  Fehrenbacher could not figure out why Taney went to so much trouble to avoid the territories 
clause and use the new states clause instead.  But Alfred Brophy suggests that Taney wanted a 
constitutional provision that would readily carry the usual constitutional limitations on national power 
rather than a provision that could plausibly be argued to give Congress “plenary power”—that is, 
unchecked, undemocratic, imperial power--over the territories (Brophy 1990, 209). 
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whole people of the Union in the exercise of the powers specifically granted” (Scott, 448).  More 
specifically, the Louisiana Territory had been acquired  
for their common and equal benefit; for it was the people of the several States, acting 
through their agent and representative, the Federal Government, who in fact acquired the 
Territory in question, and the Government holds it for their common use until it shall be 
associated with the other States as a member of the Union. (448) 
 
To ensure that every acquisition inured to the benefit of all, the national government would have 
substantial discretion to establish local governments, but in organizing the territory it could not 
“infring[e] upon the rights of person or rights of property of the citizen who might go there to 
reside, or for any other lawful purpose. It was acquired by the exercise of this discretion, and it 
must be held and governed in like manner, until it is fitted to be a State” (449). 
 So far, the reasoning hardly seems objectionable. The citizenry had equal rights to the 
territories, and the national government must respect their constitutional rights in those places. 
The problem arose, of course, when Taney applied this doctrine to establish slaveholders’ rights 
to migrate with their slaves. Declaring without controversy that migrants retained all their rights 
under the Constitution, Taney began to list some of the obvious rights that the federal 
government could not infringe. These included rights of speech, religion, peaceable assembly, 
jury rights, and so on. In short order, Taney came to the due process clause’s protection of both 
property rights and rights of the person. Then the famous sentence:  
And an act of Congress which deprives a citizen of the United States of his liberty or 
property, merely because he came himself or brought his property into a particular 
Territory of the United States, and who had committed no offence against the laws, could 
hardly be dignified with the name of due process of law. (450) 
 
 In this sentence, he did not explicitly apply this unobjectionable general principle--the 
protectibility of property under the Constitution (Ely 2008; Graber 2006)--to slavery. Nor did he 
apply it to any other particular sort of property. Nor did he bother to mention what he could 
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hardly have failed to know, given his career on the bench: that, of course, property could be 
regulated or even taken under circumstances that adequately justified the impingement. For 
Taney, given the common sense of Southern constitutional culture,23 the application of the clause 
in these circumstances was too obvious to call for detailed argument. In fact, detailed argument 
could only have been taken as a sign of doubt. Taney, I surmise, thought it beneath the Court to 
dignify the proposition that the federal government might prevent a Southerner’s bringing the 
region’s most valuable property into the common territories. How could the North not 
understand that exclusion of slavery would have been just as unthinkable as an exclusion of farm 
implements? Thus, he introduced the specific application of these unobjectionable principles to 
slavery with these contemptuous words: “It seems, however, to be supposed, that there is a 
difference between property in a slave and other property, and that different rules may be applied 
to it in expounding the Constitution of the United States” (Scott, 451). 
 Dismissing what he saw as Curtis’s sophistical attempt to inject the law of nations into 
the case, Taney insisted simply that 
if the Constitution recognizes the right of property of the master in a slave, and makes no 
distinction between that description of property and other property owned by a citizen, no 
tribunal, acting under the authority of the United States, whether it be legislative, 
executive, or judicial, has a right to draw such a distinction, or deny to it the benefit of 
the provisions and guarantees which have been provided for the protection of private 
property. (451)   
 
Moreover, the obvious equality of slave property to every other sort of legally protected property 
had been confirmed in the Constitution’s protections for the international slave trade and 
especially for the slaveholder’s right to regain her or his fugitive property even in free states. 
Under the Constitution, he thus argued, “The only power conferred is the power coupled with the 
duty of guarding and protecting the owner in his rights” (452). Concluding this section, Taney 
                                                 
23  And the South thought this a common sense that the North could hardly fail to understand. For 
evidence of this, see the capsule biographies of the Southern justices in Maltz (2007, 76-91). 
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declared that, “Upon these considerations, it is the opinion of the court that the act of Congress 
which prohibited a citizen from holding and owning property of this kind in the territory of the 
United States north of the line therein mentioned, is not warranted by the Constitution” (452). 
 Contrary to the claims of Fehrenbacher, Taney’s due process argument was in fact made 
at some length and with some care throughout this section of the opinion. Taney deployed a 
cogent logic--if one began with those assumptions that Southerners thought too fundamental to 
be questioned: the assumptions of slave-state equality and the centrality of slavery to Southern 
life (though not any claim to the rightness of slavery).  
 None of this means that Taney was unambiguously right in his construction of the law at 
that time. Looking at those same constitutional provisions with a Republican eye, it is easy to 
observe that the clause on the international slave trade actually seemed a limitation on rights to 
slave property and reflective of a common Founding expectation that slavery would wither 
before the march of liberty (Fehrenbacher 1978, 24). Similarly, the Republican Justice McLean, 
for example, was right to point out that state equality could cut more than one way. From his 
point of view, the admission of slavery into the territories effectively cut out untold numbers of 
potential Northern migrants who would justly refuse to subject themselves to life in an 
antirepublican society (Scott, 543).   
 But what reason do we have for insisting that Taney’s only honest, judicial option was to 
adopt that Republican position? What was there in a constitution that embraced slavery, both in 
its text and its history, that would rule out Taney’s version of Southern equality? What in such a 
constitution would prevent the finding of a slaveholder’s due process right to bring her or his 
property to the territory, just the same as a Northern migrant might bring her or his most essential 
property? 
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 The often admired counterargument from Curtis comprised mainly a brief review of prior 
prohibitions of slave migration and trade, none of which had been thought to implicate due 
process or its equivalents (626-27). But it is easy to see how Curtis’s citations of such precedents 
could have been viewed as missing the point. The Northwest Ordinance, for example, barring 
slavery from a huge territory, had been endorsed by most slave states, not imposed on them. 
They had endorsed it in part because the Ordinance might serve the economic interests of slave 
states (as opposed to rendering them subordinate), in part because the southwest was guaranteed 
to southern migrants as an equivalent, and in part because there was a near consensus that each 
state’s interest was advanced by adding more states as long as sectional balance was maintained 
(Freehling 1990, 138; Onuf 1983, 169-71). For Graber, then, the pertinent constitutional rule that 
underlay the Ordinance’s ban on slavery was not that any old congressional majority could ban 
slavery from any territory, but that it could do so when it had slave-state consent.  I would add 
that what underlay that notion was Taney’s principle of state equality, the idea that congressional 
regulation of property rights in slaves must rest on a foundation of slave-state equality.   
 These conditions of congressional legislation seemed no longer satisfied in 1857, the first 
time that the Court had occasion to address the question, regardless of whether they had been in 
1787 or 1820. Curtis’s reliance on the political deals that created the Northwest Ordinance and 
the Missouri Compromise manifested an appropriate respect for the constitutional practice of 
coordinate branches of government. But no one would say that congressional practice had ever 
been understood as binding on the courts in any justiciable case, especially when the premises of 
a particular constitutional settlement--here, Northern acceptance of Southern slaveholding 
equality—appeared to be obsolete by the time the Court confronted the issue. 
 Curtis’s other examples of regulation of slave property faced similar difficulties as 
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precedents. He noted that the laws of many states, slave and free, emancipated slaves who were 
voluntarily brought into the state to reside. No one cried “due process” in these instances. But, 
while these laws might have burdened slaveholders’ property rights, they did so in a way that 
preserved rather than undermined the equality and the autonomy of the states, here protecting 
their equal powers to regulate their domestic institutions as they liked. Such powers bore no 
analogy to a putative federal power to subordinate the interests of one half of the states in the 
common territories. Finally, the ban on the international slave trade might, as Curtis argued, 
deprive an American citizen of property bought outside the United States and imported within 
the borders. That ban, however, was again produced with broad slave-state support (Mason 
2000) and was never taken as subordinating the interests of the slave states to those of the free. 
 Given the indeterminacy of the original Constitution itself on the question of slavery in 
the territories, Taney’s due process claim was hardly unreasonable, let alone unjudicial. Nor, 
despite my criticisms here, was much of Curtis’s response. He offered a worthy, if not 
particularly tight, argument by combining the history of exclusion as early as the Northwest 
Ordinance with the failure of any due process clause to interfere with regulations of slave 
property before 1857.24 Taney’s resort to strict originalism--a stock piece of judicial 
disingenuousness in the face of uncertain evidence--did not really help him to answer Curtis, 
given both the indeterminacy of the text and the adoption of the Northwest Ordinance 
contemporaneously with the Constitution. Curtis’s argument, in sum, was at least judicially 
respectable to this point. 
 But then he went further, abandoning judicially plausible argument and professional 
detachment to indulge in this embarrassing objection to Taney’s due process claim:  
                                                 
24  But Alfred Brophy (1990, 211-14) has found evidence that Taney’s deployment of the due 
process clause was not wholly without precedent in this respect. 
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Moreover, if the [due process] right exists, what are its limits, and what are its 
conditions?... And what law of slavery does [any migrant] take with him to the Territory? 
If it be said to be those laws respecting slavery which existed in the particular State from 
which each slave last came, what an anomaly is this? Where else can we find, under the 
law of any civilized country, the power to introduce and permanently continue diverse 
systems of foreign municipal law, for holding persons in slavery? (Scott, 625-26, 
emphasis added)   
 
Curtis’s language has nothing to do with Taney’s argument. Taney’s defense of a due process 
right to retain one’s property hardly constituted an argument against coherent and pragmatic 
regulation of that right. Far from claiming that due process prevented any regulation touching 
slaves in any way or that state equality required the importation of every nuance of diverse 
states’ laws into the territories, he simply rejected a specific sort of deprivation of property: 
deprivation of the slave property of any migrant who came from a slave state to the territorial 
“common property.”  If due process manifestly barred at least some congressional impingements 
on migrants’ property, Taney argued, then those forbidden actions must include Congress’s 
preventing one set of settlers from migrating with their slave property as readily as it would bar 
the exclusion of others with their plows or wagons. Curtis’s argument did not lack its own power 
in places, but it was as decidedly partial as Taney’s, deeply discounting the South’s widely held 
understanding of the essentials of its society and its equality within the Union. 
 Taney’s Opinion and the History of Constitutional Politics  
 An important moral of this story so far is that the Court must be seen as one actor in a 
larger constitutional politics, a distinctive actor but one nevertheless inevitably and rightly 
attentive to the social, economic, and political history that must give shape to constitutional 
history and constitutional law.  So I want to develop the importance of the fact that the Court got 
the Scott case in 1857 rather than some years or decades earlier.  The point, though, is not that 
the Court became tainted by politics in the fevered atmosphere of 1857 in a way that it might not 
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have at another time. Rather, a properly judicial approach to a case cannot help but take account 
of the history of constitutional politics up to the particular moment of decision. Thus, although 
neither Taney nor many other judges would come right out and say it, the claim that the 1820 
legislation was unconstitutional depended, in important part, on the post-1820 history of 
constitutional politics.  This is one of Graber’s main claims and one I mean to reinforce here. 
 Imagine that a case challenging the Missouri Compromise had come before the Court in, 
say, 1827, rather than coming to the Court in 1857 as a case of first impression.  The 1827 
Marshall Court very likely would have sustained the federal ban, perhaps on the basis of that 
Court’s nationalist tendencies, or out of deference to Congress’s constitutional judgment, or in 
recognition that such an important legislative compromise, so recently established, should not be 
upset by a court.  A subsequent Taney Court then would have confronted the Scotts’ particular 
claims within a very different legal situation—one governed by square precedent—and in light 
of a constitutional history of the intervening decades that would have looked significantly 
different.   
 As it was, though, the Court had managed for thirty-seven years never to pronounce on 
the question of the legislation’s constitutionality.  The precedents it had to deal with were only 
the political precedents by which the nation had come widely, though not universally, to assume 
congressional power to bar slavery from particular territories.  But the legitimacy of that 
congressional power had arguably depended on the South’s own acceptance of the Missouri 
Compromise as a fair enough bargain, not on a clear vindication of congressional power to ban 
slavery in the territories generally.  And the maintenance of that bargain’s legitimacy over time 
arguably rested on the transsectional quality of national politics, anchored by a Democratic Party 
that effectively preserved the Southern right to veto federal regulations of slavery.   
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 The event that unsettled this arrangement, as I have said, was the introduction and 
passage in the House of the Wilmot Proviso (Hyman and Wiecek 1982, 115-140; Maltz 2007, 
ch.4).  Introduced in no spirit of compromise and without any expectation of Southern support, 
the Proviso represented an insistence on sectional equality within their own party by aggrieved 
northern Democrats.  But it was read by many southern Democrats as a slap in the face and an 
expression of contempt from their erstwhile allies in the fight for democracy.  Before this time, 
restrictions on slavery in the territories had been arguably extra-constitutional, bi-sectional 
compromises, political arrangements with which courts had little to do in practice or in principle.  
After Wilmot’s action, however, the defenders of the South saw their fate slipping into the hands 
of an ever more shockingly abolitionist North.  The waiver of constitutional rights embodied in 
the Missouri Compromise had once been compensated by both the admission of a slave state and 
an understanding, so Graber argues, that Southern consent was essential to any federal regulation 
of slavery.  After Wilmot, that arrangement gradually fell apart.   
 To the extent that Southerners came to see the evaporation of their power to veto anti-
southern legislation, the Missouri Compromise lost its constitutional foundations in their eyes.  
And all remaining ambiguity disappeared with the emergence of the Republican Party and the 
declaration of its eloquent leader that, while he would not interfere with slavery in the states, he 
would nevertheless determinedly put it in a condition where its ultimate elimination might be 
relied on (Graber 2006, 134; Fehrenbacher 1978, 487).  By the mid-1850s, Southerners had 
every justification for believing that the North was indeed turning genuinely abolitionist, the 
differences between the abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison and Abraham Lincoln mattering as 
little to Southerners as the differences between the fire-eater William Lowndes Yancey and 
Roger Taney mattered to Northerners.   
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 In this context, the Scott case came to the Court without any clear precedent, such as my 
imaginary Marshall Court case, but laden with the obligation that the Court consider the realities 
of the judicial role in the nation’s larger constitutional politics. It could hardly be surprising that 
a Southern justice, desperate to preserve peace and the Union as against the violent tendencies of 
secessionists and abolitionists alike, might move to defend the Southern veto as a legal corollary 
of basic principles of the Constitution.  Confronting the legal question at the heart of the crisis 
for the first time and confronting the substantial indeterminacy of the legal texts, the Taney Court 
could hardly be unaffected by the constitutional politics of the thirty-seven years since the 
enactment of the legislation.  Nor was the Court likely to be controlled by that politics in any 
simple, direct way.  But within the plausibly judicial range of options created by the 
conventional legal sources and the constitutional politics surrounding those sources, certainly 
there was a powerful argument for deeming the Missouri Compromise a violation of 
slaveholders’ due process rights.  The Court might adopt a suitably judicial formalism and 
declare those rights violated ab initio.  Or it might take the less judicious route of declaring that 
slaveholders’ rights were violated as of, say, the defection of Wilmot or Van Buren or, in any 
case, sometime before 1857.  As written, however, Taney’s due process holding, for all the 
uniqueness and momentousness of its context, stands as fully, imperfectly judicial. 
 Taney’s Unjudicial Moment  
 And yet, in this section of Taney’s opinion, there is one egregious, unjudicial passage.  It 
does not really appear out of place on first consideration and it is a mere two sentences of a 55-
page opinion, but in context it represents a highly unjudicial departure by Taney.  In the course 
of arguing that migrants in the territories remained covered by the Bill of Rights, Taney 
remarked that, “if Congress itself cannot [disregard migrants’ constitutional rights]—if it is 
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beyond the powers conferred on the Federal Government—it will be admitted, we presume, that 
it could not authorize a Territorial Government to exercise them.  It could confer no power on 
any local Government, established by its authority, to violate the provisions of the Constitution.” 
(Scott, 451)   
 This passage was dictum, since there was no claim in the case that any of the Scotts were 
rendered free by the action of any territorial government.  Of course, its status as dictum does not 
in and of itself render this part of the opinion unjudicial.  It could conceivably be harmless 
dictum or, perhaps, a perfectly responsible extension of the reasoning of the case to guide lower 
courts.  After all, those courts might well encounter Scott-like claims involving territorial laws 
rather than congressional laws.  It is also true that the passage appeared before Taney came to the 
specific application of his argument to the slavery question, and he never returned to the subject 
of this passage. 
 None of these defenses of Taney can stand, though, because this passage is actually the 
only one in the opinion that addresses the question then most starkly threatening the Union.  
Across the 1840s and 1850s, the Union was held together chiefly by the Democratic Party, the 
only truly transsectional institution in the nation.  But the Democrats spent all of their post-
Wilmot existence before the Civil War struggling to find a unifying position on the question of 
slavery in the territories.  The closest they came on this question was the doctrine of popular or 
territorial sovereignty, adopted and championed by Douglas in the 1850s.  This doctrine held that 
the decision whether to admit slavery to a territory must belong to the residents of that territory.  
That was a promising principle to some, but in practice it only raised the question of when the 
residents might make that momentous decision.  Could the first handful of residents in the 
territory vote to exclude slavery and thus slaveholders and thus pro-slavery votes?  Or must the 
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residents of a territory wait, uncertain of the ultimate nature of their society, slave or free, until 
the moment of statehood?  The principle of territorial sovereignty was no principle at all unless it 
could say something about timing that both North and South would accept as equal treatment. 
 By the time of the Scott decision, no such resolution was at hand, and the ill-fated race to 
control the Territory of Kansas was already underway.  Democrat James Buchanan had just 
assumed the presidency and implied in his inaugural address that the Supreme Court would settle 
the question of territorial sovereignty imminently in its Scott decision.  But that question was not 
before the Scott Court.  The constitutionality of the Missouri Compromise was before the Court, 
but territorial sovereignty was not.  Taney’s two sentences quoted above, therefore, strongly 
implying that a territorial government could not at any stage of things ban slavery from its 
territory, constituted a flagrantly unjudicial exploitation of a case before the Court.  Departing 
from the questions actually at issue, with hardly a suggestion that lower courts required guidance 
on a related question, Taney attempted to put the cultural and political weight of the judiciary on 
one side of a negotiation, however futile, that was still being conducted in the other branches of 
the government and in the nation’s public life.  Northern Democrats like Douglas pressed on 
with the policy of territorial sovereignty despite Taney’s dictum, but now with an even bigger 
hurdle to jump in the race to save the Union. 
 
Was Curtis’s Dissent Unjudicial? 
 In the sections just above, I have tried to vindicate the legal quality of Taney’s opinion 
and, in the process, offered what I think are serious criticisms of Justice Curtis’s dissent.  But I 
have so far stopped short of arguing that Curtis’s supposed masterpiece should actually be 
deemed unjudicial. The weaknesses already mentioned, however, are far from the only 
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vulnerabilities in that opinion. In fact, there are far more important ones that can and should be 
used to take Curtis’s work off its legal pedestal and suggest, therefore, that Curtis’s work was 
driven not so much by a devotion to law and judicial craftsmanship as by a determination to 
resist Southern power.  
 I will discuss several of the dissent’s flaws and conclude with the most serious: Curtis’s 
evasion of Strader, a case of such importance to the Scott questions that Curtis’s refusal to 
engage with it finally supports a judgment that the dissent was not just a politicized opinion but 
one fairly characterized as unjudicial.  In saying that, I do not condemn Curtis.  Perhaps by 1857, 
the time for adhering scrupulously to the judicial role was past.  Perhaps adhering to that role 
would only have entrenched the outsized power of the slaveholding interest in American 
governance (Fehrenbacher and McAfee 2001, Richards 2000).  In any case, I do not think that 
Curtis’s opinion can ultimately be explained by positing a desire to vindicate the law as such.  
Rather, I think it is best explained by Curtis’s readiness to consider the larger implications of the 
case in 1857, larger implications that always have the potential to inform the law as such but that 
Curtis proved unable to assimilate to law. 
 Sua Sponte Inquiry into Jurisdiction   
 Before getting to Strader, it is important to ventilate the other major problems with 
Curtis’s work.  The case opened with some rather technical questions of jurisdiction.  Curtis 
rightly addressed these at some length but not with the impartiality one might desire. Sanford had 
challenged federal jurisdiction in the court below and lost but had not sought review of that 
question because the final judgment had come out his way.  When the Scotts sought review, 
then, the Court had to determine whether it might review sua sponte the lower court’s ruling on 
jurisdiction—that is, the trial court’s holding that the Scotts might count as Article III citizens, 
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eligible to sue in federal court, despite their descent from African slaves.  As I read Curtis’s 
analysis of this question, however, it seems clear that he bent the sources out of shape so that he 
could, first, address the Missouri Compromise questions himself and, second, condemn Taney’s 
attempt to reach that question as well.   
 In affirming the Court’s authority to consider questions of jurisdiction, Curtis used the 
following language, endorsing sua sponte inquiry:  
I consider, therefore, that when there was a plea to the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court in 
a case brought here by a writ of error, the first duty of this court is, sua sponte, if not 
moved to it by either party, to examine the sufficiency of that plea; and thus to take care 
that neither the Circuit Court nor this court shall use the judicial power of the United 
States in a case to which the Constitution and laws of the United States have not extended 
that power. (Scott, 567) 
 
Taney took a similar position and used it to join Curtis in reviewing the plea in abatement as 
such, with its question whether any native black American could be an Article III citizen.  But 
Taney used it further to justify consideration of the Missouri Compromise question as well.  By 
treating that question too as a matter of jurisdiction (since a ruling that the Scotts remained slaves 
and therefore not citizens would doubly deprive the federal courts of Article III jurisdiction) and 
by affirming the Court’s power to entertain such jurisdictional questions sua sponte, Taney 
rendered his holding on the Missouri Compromise just that—holding, not dictum.  Curtis did not 
mind Taney’s addressing the citizenship question, but he clearly didn’t want Taney addressing 
the Missouri Compromise at all and so, despite his language quoted above, he was determined to 
find a way to brand Taney’s discussion extrajudicial.   
 How did he do that?  Although he had insisted on federal courts’ limiting themselves to 
their legitimate jurisdiction, even sua sponte, he contrived to limit the scope of this principle so 
that he could label Taney’s jurisdictional discussion dictum.  Sua sponte inquiry into jurisdiction 
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extended, he said, only to review of an unappealed plea to the jurisdiction in the trial court, not 
to matters of jurisdiction never disputed as such by the parties.  He took this position even 
though the underlying justification for his own jurisdictional inquiry was “the principle that the 
judicial power of the United States must not be exerted in a case to which it does not extend, 
even if both parties desire to have it exerted” (Scott, 567). That principle would imply a sua 
sponte obligation, the one exercised by Taney, to inquire into jurisdiction even beyond the 
specifics of a plea to the jurisdiction below.   
 Despite that principle, Curtis clung to his narrower claim and then pointed out (correctly 
enough) that the plea below did not aver the Scotts’ status as slaves, thus that no party had 
suggested an absence of jurisdiction on the basis of the Scotts’ slave status.  This observation set 
up Curtis’s later claim that the second half of Taney’s opinion was therefore dictum.  To support 
this move, Curtis read some highly technical precedents aggressively in his own favor (Scott, 
589-90), readings that Earl Maltz has firmly disputed despite being a fan of Curtis’s opinion 
(Maltz 2007b), rather than implementing his sensible principle that federal judges must guard 
against exercising federal power where not authorized by positive law.   
 Curtis’s disingenuousness is further demonstrated by his subsequent language 
condemning Taney’s sua sponte inquiry:  
A great question of constitutional law [the Missouri Compromise question], deeply 
affecting the peace and welfare of the country, is not, in my opinion, a fit subject to be 
thus reached. 
 But as, in my opinion, the Circuit Court had jurisdiction, I am obliged to consider 
the question whether its judgment on the merits of the case should stand or be reversed. 
(590)   
 
A reasonable enough statement on its face, it would have been at least as well applied against 
Curtis himself rather than used against Taney.  Curtis had many ways of avoiding this “great 
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question of constitutional law” and no good way to justify reaching it.  As I will argue below, a 
fair engagement with the Strader precedent almost certainly would have kept the Missouri 
Compromise out of the case.  Similarly, Curtis could have stuck with his claim that the contracts 
clause guaranteed the Scotts’ emancipation without getting into the constitutionality of the 
Missouri Compromise (Maltz 2007b; more on that below).  Finally, he could have simply 
dissented without further opinion, a common enough practice in those days. Moreover, it is 
critical that he did not say that he was compelled to carry on because Taney had; he was not 
simply answering Taney on a question that Taney should never have injected into the opinion.  
Rather, his words made clear that he was going on to the Missouri Compromise question no 
matter what, exploiting his role as a justice to pronounce on a constitutional question then before 
the country but not necessarily before the Court.  At the same time, he denied Taney the right to 
discuss that same issue, despite Taney’s equally plausible, if equally self-serving, argument that 
he was merely completing his inquiry into the court’s jurisdiction.   
 Curtis’s language thus lends weight to the claim that Taney addressed the Missouri 
Compromise only because Curtis and McLean had made clear that they would.25  No doubt, 
Taney wanted his opinion to cover all the ground and settle the national question, as did Curtis 
                                                 
25  Scholars of the case have argued for some time about the sequence of events that led to the 
opinions’ covering the issues they did. Maltz (2007, 106-117) offers a concise, recent account.  At one 
point, all agree, it was the determination of the justices to allow New York’s Justice Nelson to write a 
more or less minimalist opinion deferring to the authority of the Missouri Supreme Court on a Missouri 
question.  It is clear, though, that there were Northern justices determined to write dissents that would 
address the Missouri Compromise and Southern justices who badly wanted an opinion that would 
vindicate Southern rights much more broadly than Nelson’s would have.  Did Taney ultimately write 
because he knew that McLean and Curtis would and could not let them go unanswered?  Did Curtis write 
only when he was sure that the Southerners were certain to write an opinion reaching the Missouri 
Compromise?  The precise dynamics within the Court cannot be nailed down, but I think it is fair to say 
that Curtis was not simply reacting to a gratuitous provocation from Taney.  Rather, both sides had 
increasingly become convinced that it was in some sense their responsibility to give an authoritative 
judicial reading of the Constitution in its relations to territorial slavery.  Curtis’s opinion was not simply a 
matter of a dissenter disputing the majority’s illegitimate discussion of the Missouri Compromise.  
Rather, it was the product of Curtis’s considered decision, for better or worse, to announce in his official 
capacity his view of the constitutional question regardless of whether the Southerners did. 
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apparently.  But, even if he’d wanted to write more narrowly, he could hardly have sat back and 
watched Curtis make the anti-Southern case without an answer from the Court, as long as there 
was a legitimate legal route to the question for him.  More to the point, as long as Curtis was 
determined to go on to the Missouri question, he was hardly in a position to complain that Taney 
was addressing the question as well.  It’s difficult to blame him for doing whatever proved 
necessary to undermine any slavery-entrenching pronouncement from the Court, but such a 
motivation was, of course, at least as partisan as any motivation of Taney’s.   As Allen (2006, 
181) notes, the weight of scholarly opinion has been that the second half of Taney’s opinion was 
not dictum. Yet the charge has been repeated ever since, and even those who know better have 
failed to take Curtis to task for disingenuously insisting that it was.26 
  The Privileges and Immunities Clause 
 Curtis next looked to neutralize the Southern parade of horribles said to lie within the 
privileges and immunities clause. Southerners claimed that recognition of black citizenship 
would empower black citizens to enter the slave states and claim dangerous rights of travel, of 
free speech, of property, even the right to vote and to hold federal and even state offices.  To 
Southerners, it was obvious that such rights for blacks would instantly destroy the racist 
discipline that preserved the peace.  Hardly a racial liberal himself (Streichler 2005), Curtis 
resisted the argument by painting the privileges and immunities clause as perfectly 
accommodating to racist discrimination; it barred discrimination only against out-of-state 
                                                 
26  Fehrenbacher was clearly of the view that Taney’s treatment of the Missouri Compromise was 
not dictum at all, thus disagreeing with Curtis, but he never squarely faced Curtis’s deep vulnerability on 
this score, preferring to portray Curtis’s argument as “very impressive” (Fehrenbacher 1978, 330-32, 403-
14, quotation at 4).  A limited exception is Maltz (2007b, 275-76), who acknowledges that Curtis’s 
position was so untenable that it must be attributed to the “heat of the controversy.”  Maltz more or less 
excuses Curtis for this by supposing that he had no desire to address the Missouri Compromise and was 
angered by Taney’s virtually compelling him to.  Maltz also thinks that this mistake was just one slip-up 
in an otherwise sound and eminently judicial opinion (265). 
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persons as such.  Thus each state would remain perfectly free to apply its racist distinctions and 
discipline to out-of-state blacks just as they applied to in-state blacks, regardless of anyone’s 
status as a citizen (Scott, 582-584).   
 That is a plausible argument on first impression (though deeply racist).  But at the time 
there persisted a widely held and, at least in its more limited form, an almost irresistible view to 
the contrary.  Many believed that the privileges and immunities clause actually did guarantee an 
undefined but substantial body of basic rights to every American citizen (Smith 1997; Curtis 
2000).  Without some such core set of rights, what would citizenship even mean?  At a 
minimum, these rights would have included a freedom to travel into any state.  Even that 
minimal right—a right of free blacks to travel through slave states with their freedom and their 
citizenship (if not their full equality) guaranteed by federal law--was thought to endanger the 
allegedly indispensable system of racist discipline.  The failure of Curtis to acknowledge so 
serious an implication manifested at least as partisan a view of the law as anything that Taney 
wrote.  (And the thorough-going racism of Curtis’s argument makes him hardly more appealing 
than Taney in this phase of the argument.) 
 Strader and Comity  
 While there is no smoking gun in Curtis’s dissent quite as clear as those in Marbury v. 
Madison (1803) and Bush v. Gore (2000), I think that Curtis’s treatment of Missouri’s claim to 
final authority over the status of its inhabitants—regardless of the status of the Missouri 
Compromise or other foreign law--and especially his evasion of the precedent in Strader v. 
Graham (1850) well justifies the judgment that his opinion was an unjudicial bid to resist the 
entrenchment of Southern power. Strader declared in 1850 that the slave status (or not) of any 
inhabitant of any state was a question firmly within the control of that state. Curtis believed that 
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the law of Illinois and/or the Missouri Compromise would have freed the Scotts, but here he had 
to confront the Strader claim that such putative, out-of-state emancipations were irrelevant and 
without authority once the Scotts were back in Missouri. The Missouri Supreme Court, after all, 
had explicitly declined to extend comity on the question of slave status in the Scotts’ own case.  
Curtis responded by ignoring Strader completely while insisting on the novel proposition that 
slave status was a matter of general law in the mode of Swift v. Tyson (1842)27 rather than forum 
law.28   
 Curtis commenced his efforts to avoid Strader by artificially separating the question of 
Missouri’s obligation to enforce the Scotts’ freedom into two parts.  Rather than begin with a 
clear analysis of the most pertinent federal case law, he took a confusing and useless detour into 
some legal metaphysics.  Thus, he chose first to analyze whether the emancipating laws of 
Congress and Illinois purported affirmatively to dissolve the slave’s status as slave—that is, 
harbored the extraterritorial ambition “absolutely to dissolve the relation, and terminate the rights 
                                                 
27  Some cases come into federal court under “diversity jurisdiction”; that is, when the opposing 
parties are from different or “diverse” states and are thus entitled under Article III to be heard in federal 
court rather than in the courts of the home state of one of the parties, even though no federal law is 
involved in the case. For some (but not all) categories of diversity cases, Swift v. Tyson (1842) held that 
federal courts would apply “general law”--that is, the federal judges’ own notion of appropriate 
substantive law--even when it differed substantially from the law that the pertinent state court would have 
applied in the same case. Before Curtis wrote his Scott opinion, the Supreme Court had never thought 
general law applicable to questions of slave status. 
28  Note, though, that Curtis never unambiguously answered the question whether he, as a federal 
judge, conceived himself an enforcer of Missouri state law or of an independently founded general law of 
personal status. He seemed mostly to insist that the Missouri courts were obliged to recognize the Scotts’ 
freedom as a matter of their own law, since he articulated the chief question at issue in this way: “whether 
the State of Missouri recognizes and allows the effect of that law of the Territory [the Missouri 
Compromise law], on the status of the slave, on his return within its jurisdiction” (Scott, 590, emphasis in 
original).  Still, as I’ll note below, there are other indications that he might have recognized the power of 
the Missouri courts to do as they did. After all, he never suggested that the Court could have overturned 
the Missouri Supreme Court decision if it had been appealed directly. No one seems to have disputed the 
notion that the Court would have lacked jurisdiction over such an appeal and thus would have been forced 
to acknowledge the legitimacy of the Missouri court’s ruling. The heart of his argument, then, however 
obscurely articulated at times, was that the Court nevertheless retained its own authority to disregard 
Missouri law as announced by the Missouri Supreme Court and instead apply general law in federal 
diversity jurisdiction. 
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of the master existing under the law of the country whence the parties came” (Scott, 591).  If they 
purported to do so, then, Curtis seemed to believe, Missouri would bear an obligation to embrace 
the Scotts’ foreign emancipation.  Alternatively, if those foreign laws simply refused state 
support for the owner’s implementation of the slave relation within the jurisdiction, Missouri 
would not have to treat the returning Scotts as emancipated.   
 Apparently, Curtis believed that these two ostensibly different kinds of laws would have 
different consequences for the Scotts.  But it is very hard to see why they would.  The foreign 
emancipation amounts to a full emancipation in the foreign jurisdiction (Illinois or the Wisconsin 
Territory) in either case.  Whether the local law declares the freedom of every erstwhile slave 
who enters the jurisdiction or just declares that its laws will not protect the erstwhile master’s 
right to enforce obedience, the state carries out an emancipation.  But in neither case is there any 
obvious reason to think that that emancipation has any extraterritorial authority in the forum state 
(Missouri), except as some law of the forum prescribes. And Curtis never explained why there 
would be.  He simply chose to identify the Missouri Compromise as a statute with extraterritorial 
ambitions, even as he failed to explain why Congress got to have such ambitions honored 
(assuming implausibly that those ambitions existed at all) at the expense of Missouri’s authority 
over the status of its inhabitants. In other words, the question remained, what law obliged 
Missouri courts to recognize a change in status for the Scotts within the boundaries of 
Missouri?29 
                                                 
29  Curtis’s effort to demonstrate the existence of a law that would so oblige the Missouri courts was 
exceedingly tortured and dependent on a disingenuous over-reading of case law.  He relied chiefly on the 
opinion of Henry St. George Tucker in Betty v. Horton (Va., 1833), a case where the allegedly important 
distinction between the two kinds of laws above “is very clearly stated” (Scott, 592).  In that case, a 
Massachusetts citizen married into ownership of two slaves in Virginia and removed them to 
Massachusetts, somewhat later moving permanently to Virginia with the “slaves” in tow.  Ultimately 
deciding the case in favor of emancipation entirely under Virginia statute law, Tucker’s opinion 
recognized only in dictum that, had a Massachusetts court actually declared the slaves free while in 
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 Curtis did pay lip service to Missouri’s authority by positive law to deny recognition to 
foreign emancipations, so it was just Missouri’s courts that he thought the federal courts could 
and should order around.  But he had a very difficult time explaining why. He deemed it 
adequate simply to accuse the Missouri Supreme Court of acting on political motivations and 
then substitute the federal Supreme Court’s authority for that of the Missouri Court:   
[I]n my opinion, it is not within the province of any judicial tribunal to refuse such 
recognition [of foreign laws] from any political considerations, or any view it may take of 
the exterior political relations between the State and one or more foreign States, or any 
impressions it may have that a change of foreign opinion and action on the subject of 
slavery may afford a reason why the State should change its own action. To understand 
and give just effect to such considerations, and to change the action of the State in 
consequence of them, are functions of diplomatists and legislators, not of judges. (Scott, 
594-95) 
 
But even if the Missouri decision was properly characterized as “political,” what law authorized 
the substitution of Justice Curtis’s own view of Missouri law? 
 Curtis’s strongest argument was that the marriage of the Scotts, consented to by their 
owners and solemnized in free territory, vitiated any attempt to maintain their slave status (Scott, 
599-601).  Curtis claimed that, once the Scotts were freed either by the Missouri Compromise 
law or by the consent of their owners (as manifested in their endorsement of the marriage), their 
                                                 
Massachusetts, then “national law” would have required the Virginia courts to enforce that ruling.  
Presumably, he referred to the Full Faith and Credit Clause (FFC) of the Constitution.  But, of course, the 
Scotts had no such adjudication and no claim on the FFC when they sued in Missouri.  Tucker had gone 
on to opine that Virginia courts would have “respect[ed] and follow[ed]” Massachusetts law in this case 
even without an adjudication if it were shown that Massachusetts law had been interpreted on such facts 
to emancipate slaves of its own force (and in that sense to be “more operative than the common law”).  
But he nowhere indicated that that result would have flowed from anything but the Virginia court’s 
exercise of comity as a kind of discretionary equivalent of the FFC’s rule for actual adjudications.  
Nothing in the case supports Curtis’s search for a principle that Virginia (in Betty v. Horton) or Missouri 
(in Scott) bore some obligation to recognize extraterritorial ambitions of free states or territories.  Nor 
does the case even clearly draw the distinction that Curtis relied on between emancipations intended fully 
to dissolve an individual’s slave status and emancipations intended only to deny the owner the assistance 
of the law domestically.  It is possible that that distinction too was in Tucker’s mind—there is language 
that could possibly indicate so--but what he actually wrote about, only in passing and only in what was 
explicitly acknowledged as dictum, was the relationship between the authority of foreign adjudications 
via the FFC and the authority of foreign law without an adjudication, presumably via comity. 
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marriage was protected even in Missouri by “international law”—by which Curtis simply meant 
principles of law embraced across many jurisdictions--and by the contracts clause of the federal 
Constitution.  And, since slave status was inconsistent with marriage, Missouri could not reassert 
the slave status of the Scotts. But the same source that Curtis cited for the principle of 
international law that “a marriage, valid by the law of the place where it was contracted, . . . is 
valid everywhere” (Scott, 599) also noted that there were exceptions to that rule.  Curtis did not 
mention these exceptions, which, taken together, suggested the almost unavoidable principle that 
recognition of foreign marriages would always face some limits in the public policies of the 
forum state.30  And it was not for Curtis to tell Missouri what its public policy might have to say 
about legal recognition of a marriage like the Scotts’. 
 Perfectly aware of the Missouri court’s explication of its own state law in its own 
disposition of the Scotts’ claims, Curtis grasped for some means to deny that Court’s authority to 
articulate law for the Scotts’ circumstances. He thus asserted finally that questions of slave status 
should be treated as matters of general law rather than state law--much as Swift treated the law of 
                                                 
30  Joel Prentiss Bishop’s 1856 Commentaries on the Law of Marriage and Divorce, and Evidence 
in Matrimonial Suits did take quite an expansive view of Curtis’s quoted principle but still recognized 
that incest and polygamy formed recognized exceptions and assumed that mental incapacity would do so 
as well (Bishop 1856, §§125-30).  And Curtis’s sharp but fleeting reference to the Dartmouth College 
Case on the contracts clause issue effectively opened but hardly closed the question of how the contracts 
clause might apply.  Like Bishop’s treatise, the Dartmouth College Court had given no thought to the 
distant question whether the institution of slavery might create exceptions to the general obligation to 
recognize out-of-state marriages, especially given the Constitution’s substantial accommodation of 
slavery. No state need recognize within its borders a marriage that violates its public policy in a 
sufficiently important way, Bishop grudgingly acknowledged.  (Earl Maltz agrees that “To the extent that 
it relied on the claim that Missouri was constitutionally required to recognize the validity of the 
Wisconsin marriage, [Curtis’s] analysis was doctrinally suspect” (Maltz 2007b, 270-71).) And the 
Dartmouth College Court, of course, focused its energies on questions totally unrelated to whether a state 
would have been legally and constitutionally required to recognize a marriage between persons whom it 
would otherwise have considered slaves. Curtis offered the beginnings of a serious argument here, but his 
utter unwillingness to consider the limits of “international law” and the contracts clause under a 
Constitution that accommodated slavery and offered states substantial autonomy marked his opinion as 
highly partial and incomplete. For an extended discussion of the significance (or not) of the Scotts’ 
marriage, see VanderVelde and Subramanian (1997, 1103-17). 
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contracts--even though they had never before been so treated by the Court:   
[W]e come to the consideration whether the rules of international law, which are part of 
the laws of Missouri until displaced by some statute not alleged to exist, do or do not 
require the status of the plaintiff, as fixed by the laws of the Territory of Wisconsin, to be 
recognized in Missouri. Upon such a question, not depending on any statute or local 
usage, but on principles of universal jurisprudence, this court has repeatedly asserted it 
could not hold itself bound by the decisions of State courts, however great respect might 
be felt for their learning, ability, and impartiality. (See Swift v. Tyson, 16 Peters's R., 1; 
Carpenter v. The Providence Ins. Co., Ib., 495; Foxcroft v. Mallet, 4 How., 353; Rowan v. 
Runnels, 5 How., 134.) (Scott, 603)   
 
In this passage, he nakedly asserted that “international law” or “universal jurisprudence” 
authorized the Court’s disregard of Missouri law on questions of slave status. For that 
conclusion, however, he cited only the four commercial law cases that appear at the end of the 
block quote above, each of which stood for the general proposition that commercial cases in 
diversity would be treated as subject to the general law.  None addressed slave status in any way.  
Only the last of these citations, Rowan v. Runnels, touched on slavery at all, but it too was about 
the validity of a contract and could not in any way be taken to hint that slave status was a matter 
of general law. 
 Such authority as there was ran against Curtis pretty strongly. Cases like Groves v. 
Slaughter (1841)31 and Prigg v. Pennsylvania (1842)32 were not especially on point but 
emphasized the local quality of the law of slavery with the exception of fugitive slave cases. 
More importantly, this was the place to confront Strader. Strader was the very foundation of 
                                                 
31  In Groves, the question was whether the federal commerce clause restricted Mississippi’s power 
to bar sales of slaves into its territory from out of state. Six of the seven participating justices embraced 
firm state control over apparently everything to do with slavery within the state’s borders. 
32  In Prigg, the Court confronted the question whether states might legislate the procedures for the 
return of fugitive slaves. For the Court, Justice Story recited the usual declaration that slavery was “a 
mere municipal regulation” (Prigg v. Pennsylvania 1842, 611) that could not create an obligation outside 
the state to return a fugitive. Only the Constitution’s fugitive slave clause could positively do that, and he 
read that clause to place power over fugitive rendition exclusively in the federal government. Although 
the clause thus federalized one discrete area of slave law, Prigg reinforced the notion that each state might 
have its own law of personal status and bore no obligation to involve itself in that of any other state. 
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Justice Samuel Nelson’s opinion, joined by a majority of the Court, which held that, whatever 
the effect of foreign laws within their own territories, Missouri was entitled to determine the 
status of its own inhabitants (Scott, 462-65). Taney, too, relied explicitly on Strader (453).  But 
Curtis did not even address the case.   
 Read strictly for its holding, Strader did not absolutely exclude the possibility that 
personal status might prove a matter of general law in diversity, since that precise question was 
not before the Court; it only held that personal status was not a federal question that could create 
jurisdiction in the Supreme Court on appeal from a state court. Read with any sort of good faith, 
however, Strader stood as a clear declaration from the Court that the law of personal status was 
state law to which federal courts must defer. Groves, Prigg, and Strader, in effect, sought to 
minimize points of interstate friction on slavery questions by giving every state firm authority 
over its own inhabitants, except when the national government stepped in to return fugitive 
slaves. These cases, then, and especially Strader, clearly called for federal courts to adhere to 
state policies when cases came before them. By strong implication, the Court had decided against 
creating an independent general law of status that might invite the Scotts and others in their 
position into federal court, in search of foreign judges willing to hear freedom suits and craft a 
law more to their liking.   
 Moreover, the Strader Court had promulgated these principles of state autonomy without 
pertinent challenge or qualification from any member of the Court only a few years before. Here 
is the critical language of Strader, which vindicated forum law in a case that turned on whether 
certain Kentucky slaves had gained their freedom when rented out to work in Ohio:  
Every state has an undoubted right to determine the status, or domestic and social 
condition, of the persons domiciled within its territory; except in so far as the powers of 
the states in this respect are restrained, or duties and obligations imposed upon them, by 
the Constitution of the United States. There is nothing in the Constitution of the United 
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States that can in any degree control the law of Kentucky upon this subject. And the 
condition of the negroes, therefore, as to freedom or slavery, after their return, depended 
altogether upon the laws of that state, and could not be influenced by the laws of Ohio. It 
was exclusively in the power of Kentucky to determine for itself whether their 
employment in another state should or should not make them free on their return. The 
Court of Appeals [of Kentucky] have determined, that by the laws of the state they 
continued to be slaves. And their judgment upon this point is, upon this writ of error, 
conclusive upon this court, and we have no jurisdiction over it. (Strader v. Graham 1850, 
93-94)   
 
 In the same opinion, Taney declared without challenge that even the federal Northwest 
Ordinance, were it still the law of Ohio,33 could have no authority in Kentucky, except such as 
Kentucky chose to give it: “The Ordinance in question, if still in force, could have no more 
operation than the laws of Ohio in the state of Kentucky, and could not influence the decision 
upon the rights of the master or the slaves in that state, nor give this court jurisdiction upon the 
subject” (Strader, 94). This remark was not holding perhaps, but it was closely related to the 
ratio decidendi and went unchallenged (because it was obviously correct). And it spoke almost 
exactly to the Scott scenario, with the Northwest Ordinance playing the part of the Missouri 
Compromise. If Strader did not technically rule out the creation of a general law of personal 
status, it emphatically expressed the convictions of every member of the Court in 1850 that the 
states retained complete control on questions of slave status, even in the Scotts’ circumstances.  
 Here was a very steep hill for Curtis to climb, but he did not even acknowledge its 
existence. Rather than confront the language of Strader, he simply asserted the applicability of 
an international law and a general jurisprudence that would have armed the federal courts to 
intrude into the slave states’ law of status in unprecedented ways and in deep tension with the 
Strader precedent. Such an unanticipated result could hardly have seemed less political to the 
                                                 
33  The Ordinance governed Ohio and other states-to-be when they were territories, but lost its legal 
force when these territories became states. There were those who claimed that the Ordinance’s abolition 
of slavery in those territories disabled the subsequent states from ever introducing slavery as well, but that 
argument never cut much ice and was rejected, in dictum but without dissent, by Strader. 
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slave states than the Missouri Supreme Court’s adoption of a new rule of comity seemed to 
Curtis.   
 If Curtis could not find a way to compel Missouri to recognize foreign emancipations, 
then he had no basis as a judge for discussing the constitutionality of the Missouri Compromise 
at all. But he wanted to discuss the constitutionality of the Compromise so that he could defend 
federal power against assertions of slaveholders’ rights. He had to create some law that would 
allow the Supreme Court to control the Missouri courts on local questions of personal status. To 
do so, he ignored and defied the unanimous declarations of the Strader justices. 
 Curtis offered no legal basis for treating questions of slave status in the American context 
as matters of general law on a par with Swift’s questions of commercial law. And, as I’ve argued 
above, this was far from the only question in the case that Curtis seems to have manipulated. 
Identifying only one significant manipulation and admitting his abiding admiration for Curtis, 
Earl Maltz (2007b) nevertheless concludes that, “When his political beliefs were strongly 
engaged, even a judge as committed to legal ideology as Curtis was willing to twist doctrine in 
order to vindicate those beliefs” (276). I think it clear that Curtis did quite a bit of doctrine-
twisting, climaxing with his willful refusal to respect Strader and apply Missouri law to the 
Scotts.34 As I’ve further suggested, none of this implies that Curtis deserves condemnation. 
Contrary to Graber, I think it likely that the times called for an unjudicial ruling, if that was the 
                                                 
34 There remains the claim that Missouri law itself was on the Scotts’ side.  That is, even when 
applying Strader, some have argued that the relevant Missouri law was not that in the Missouri 
Supreme Court’s own Scott opinion but that in its earlier case law.  I’ve always found that claim 
a little much, since it effectively denies a state supreme court the authority to adjust its law to 
changing circumstances or overrule its prior decisions.  But, in any case, Curtis did very little 
with this argument: he quoted the argument of the dissenter in the Missouri court, who of course 
opposed the majority’s new articulation of Missouri law but lost; and he cited without discussion 
some Supreme Court precedent that said that the Court was not necessarily bound by the most 
recent state case in determining state law.  But he did not discuss these cases or develop the 
argument, preferring instead to focus on the claim discussed in the main text here.  
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only way for a person in Curtis’s position to draw a line against slaveholder power. But the right 
thing to do is not necessarily the judicial thing to do. 
 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
His ruminations on “constitutional evil” to one side, Mark Graber’s Dred Scott and the 
Problem of Constitutional Evil (2006) is one of the most imaginative and insightful works of 
constitutional history in recent times. Read critically and synthesized with a fertile collection of 
other recent work, it repositions Scott in a narrative of “the slaveholding republic.”  In this new 
narrative, the Scott case is one climax of a constitutional history that recognizes the thorough 
implication of the Constitution in the perpetuation of slavery after 1787, both in the courts and in 
the social and political practices that worked together to establish constitutional meaning. I have 
tried to show that a review of these studies and the Scott opinions implies that by 1857 there 
remained little or no scope for a genuinely judicial opinion of the Supreme Court that would 
emancipate the Scotts.  I want to emphasize that I am not saying that it was impossible, only that 
my review of Curtis’s failed effort to do so demonstrates how little scope there was and how 
desperate the plight of the Constitution had become for those who would resist the South 
judicially rather than politically. In my judgment, Curtis confronted this predicament by 
choosing to be on the right side of history rather than adhere to a construction of the law that was 
true to the available materials. 
In some ways, the greatest achievement of Graber’s book, one that this essay is meant to 
vindicate, is its demonstration of the indispensability of a broad-gauged constitutional history, 
fully encompassing all of the nation’s political institutions and dynamics, to any adequate history 
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of the courts’ encounters with the Constitution.  My reliance on Freehling and related works is 
meant to show the benefits of pressing even more broadly into the history of the times, if one 
wants to understand what courts are up to and up against. After all, the sources of law can never 
just be formal legal texts; they cannot help but include the governed society’s common 
assumptions--and often actively disputed assumptions--about the essentials of its social 
dynamics, its economic life, and its peace and safety.  
The broader history teaches us, among other things, that racism deeply infected the 
Constitution and all of American culture, as did slavery. Taney’s and Curtis’s Scott opinions 
battled over the proper way to implement what both understood as a more or less deeply racist 
Constitution. If Curtis rejected Taney’s assertion that the Constitution was made only for the 
white race, he nevertheless remained comfortable with the Constitution’s accommodation of the 
pervasive, racist degradation of so many of his fellow Americans. In fact, his opinion embraced a 
power to deny citizenship--national citizenship as well as state citizenship--merely on the basis 
of race. And, of course, the Constitution offered substantial protection to racist slavery, at least 
by means of the fugitive slave clause, which Curtis defended, and the three-fifths clause.35  
Oddly, though, Curtis has come down to us as a hero because at the climactic moment of his 
professional life, he chose to resist the full claims of slaveholder power under this racist 
Constitution. Because American historians and intellectuals of all stripes now unanimously share 
values closer to those of Benjamin Curtis--in that one moment, anyway--than to those of Roger 
Taney, it has proven extraordinarily difficult for them to see the polemical qualities of Curtis’s 
opinion and the judicial craftsmanship in Taney’s. 
In the second half of this essay, I have offered some technical analysis of the Taney and 
                                                 
35  Curtis’s constitutional thinking and pointed racism are given valuable treatment in Streichler 
(2005). 
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Curtis opinions in light of the socioconstitutional history laid out in the first half. That analysis 
largely vindicates the legal quality of Taney’s opinion. However much we might criticize Taney 
for absorbing the slave states’ pathologies and reading them into law, he did so largely in proper, 
judicial fashion under a Constitution that broadly accommodated racist slavery. And he did so in 
an effort to pit the pacifying authority of law against the appalling violence seemingly threatened 
by the course of the political branches, by the Northern “abolitionists,” and (not least) by his own 
section’s secessionist radicals. It is also true, however, that the substance of Taney’s ruling 
threatened to entrench ever more deeply the national power of the slaveholding class and the 
geographic reach of slavery itself. This result, apparently, Curtis could not endorse. Where 
Taney slipped over the line to unjudicial conduct only once and only briefly (though very 
clearly), Curtis, in my judgment, did so frequently and importantly, rendering his opinion as a 
whole more a political shot across the bow than a judicial opinion. It remains unclear why Curtis 
resigned shortly after the case was decided, but, with Scott on the books, it seems fitting that he 
could no longer see himself on the bench. 
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